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1Framework Paper
The raison d’eˆtre of financial markets is the allocation of capital. An optimal alloca-
tion of capital requires the financial markets to be informationally efficient, so that
security prices fully reflect all available information (Fama, 1991). However, finan-
cial markets vary in their degree of market efficiency, or as Warren Buffett famously
quipped: ’I’d be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets were always effi-
cient’. Hence, the role of moderating factors that might affect the degree of market
efficiency and the functioning of markets is a matter of an ongoing academic dis-
cussion. Central open questions include the following: Which market structure, a
setting with an intermediary (a quote-driven market) or a pure exchange-based de-
sign (an order-driven market), exhibits higher market efficiency? Why do we observe
a coexistence of quote-driven and order-driven market structures? To what extent
does investor sentiment affect market efficiency? How does liquidity affect market
efficiency?
Empirical studies of financial markets face a number of difficulties that prevent
researchers from properly isolating the determinants of market efficiency. For in-
stance, the fundamental values of traditional financial products are never revealed,
because they are infinitely-lived. Therefore, all field studies must test market efficiency
jointly with an equilibrium model that defines normal security returns (Fama, 1970).
Moreover, comparisons of market efficiency and functioning across financial market
structures are often hampered by differences in the assets traded and/or differences
in macroeconomic conditions.
Betting markets exhibit a variety of unique properties that circumvent the prob-
lems that inhibit the investigation of conventional financial markets. Similar to securi-
2ties and derivatives traded in financial markets, a bet is a state-contingent contractual
claim on some future cash flow. Thereby, the cash flow is determined by the outcome
of the bet’s underlying event, e.g., a soccer match, and by the price of the contract,
i.e., the odds on a specific event (Sauer, 1998). One major advantage of betting
markets is that each betting contract possesses a prespecified end point at which the
outcome (e.g., the winning of a particular team) becomes observable. The bet’s odds
may well deviate from its hypothetical fundamental value for some period of time,
but at the end of the underlying event, the fundamental value of each betting con-
tract is revealed. The observed outcome of a bet thereby serves as an indisputable
benchmark against which the informational efficiency of market odds can be tested
(Vaughan Williams, 1999). Additionally, a bet’s underlying event is neither influ-
enced by expectations of market participants or trading activity, nor is it influenced
by macroeconomic factors.
Another feature that makes betting markets an interesting research field for fi-
nancial studies is the coexistence of the quote-driven and the order-driven market
structure, in which identical betting contracts are traded simultaneously (Verbeek,
2011). Similar to market makers in financial markets, bookmakers operate in a quote-
driven market structure, serving as intermediaries between bettors. Thereby, book-
makers quote the odds at which they are willing to accept bets and participate in
every transaction (Harris, 2003). Since 2000, betting exchanges have evolved in the
betting industry. As order-driven financial markets, betting exchanges allow buyers
and sellers to trade with each other in a continuous double auction, without the in-
termediation of bookmakers. In this market structure, two basic types of orders exist:
limit orders and market orders. A market order is immediately executed at the best
odds available, whereas limit orders have guaranteed odds, but the execution takes
3place only if there is a corresponding order on the opposite side of the market. If
the limit order is not matched, it is placed in the limit order book until it is either
executed or canceled (De Jong & Rindi, 2009).
Overall, betting markets offer a simple and clean research laboratory for financial
market microstructure investigations. One goal of this dissertation is to compare the
two different market structures in terms of market efficiency and price competitive-
ness. Moreover, this dissertation aims to explore how investor sentiment and liquidity
influence market efficiency. These issues are individually addressed in four empirical
papers.
The first paper, The Impact of Market Structures on Market Efficiency: Evidence
from the Betting Industry (see Appendix A.1), investigates the comparative market
efficiency of the quote-driven and the order-driven market structure. The impact
of the market structure on market efficiency is an ongoing debate in the market
microstructure literature and earlier studies have produced weak and/or inconsistent
results (Madhavan, 1992; Biais, 1993; Masulis & Shivakumar, 2002; Theissen, 2000;
Bennett & Wei, 2006).
We utilize the betting industry to compare the market structures in terms of mar-
ket efficiency. Previous studies in betting markets have shown that the betting ex-
change market exhibits a higher market efficiency than the bookmaker market (Smith,
Paton, & Vaughan Williams, 2006, 2009; Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2010). The pa-
per expands this literature by employing a more comprehensive data set and a new
econometric approach to address the comparative market efficiency.
Our data set consists of pairs of odds from the bookmaker and the betting exchange
market from 9,562 matches played in the top five European soccer leagues. The
results demonstrate that the odds from the betting exchange Betfair contain relevant
4information that is not fully included in the odds quoted by bookmakers. However,
the odds from the bookmakers provide no additional information to the odds from
the betting exchange. Thus, the quote-driven market exhibits lower market efficiency
than the order-driven market. Taking advantage of the inefficient odds available at the
quote-driven market leads to above-average, and in some cases even positive bettor
returns.
To improve the design of markets, it is important to understand the impact of
market structures on market efficiency. Thereby, the order-driven market structure
seems to provide a more efficient algorithm for collecting and aggregating diverse
information than profit-maximizing market makers.
The second paper, The Liquidity Advantage of Quote-driven Markets: Evidence
from the Betting Industry (see Appendix A.2), examines the puzzling coexistence of
the quote-driven bookmaker market and the order-driven betting exchange market.
Although betting exchanges offer superior odds and returns to bettors, face less oper-
ational risk, have lower information costs and exhibit higher market efficiency, book-
makers continue to be successful. This ongoing success of bookmakers is surprising,
as network externalities due to the migration of trading volume to the market with
lower costs should lead to a consolidation into a single market structure (Madhavan,
2000).
In this paper we suggest a source of competitive advantage of the quote-driven
market structure that has been neglected by the literature: the benefits arising from
the continuous liquidity provision of the bookmaker. According to Demsetz (1968),
a key function of market makers in financial markets is the supply of immediacy by
continuously quoting prices and providing liquidity to the asynchronous arrival of
orders from investors. In order-driven markets, however, liquidity is solely provided
5by the flow of orders from market participants and a lack of liquidity increases both
transaction and waiting costs.
Using panel data of pairs of bookmaker and betting exchange odds for over 17,000
soccer matches played worldwide, we find that a major bookmaker offers more favor-
able odds than a major betting exchange until 6 hours before match start for home win
bets and until 3.5 hours before match start for away win bets. Thereafter, the book-
maker offers less favorable odds. Hence, the bookmaker is more competitive during
earlier stages of the pre-play period whereas the betting exchange is more competitive
shortly before match start. Furthermore, we show that the price competitiveness of
the betting exchange depends crucially on liquidity. The lack of liquidity leads to a
lower price competitiveness at the order-driven market compared to the quote-driven
market with unrestricted liquidity. Hence, the active management of quotes offers a
distinct liquidity advantage.
This finding helps to explain the ongoing coexistence of the two market structures,
as early betting volume should migrate to the more competitive bookmaker market.
Moreover, our analysis sheds some light on the recent shift of financial markets into
hybrid market structures where orders from individual traders compete with market
makers. As market makers are particularly valuable when liquidity at the order book
is low, hybrid structures combine the advantages of both the quote- and order-driven
structure.
The third paper, Does Bettor Sentiment affect Bookmaker Pricing? (see Ap-
pendix A.3), examines the question of whether bookmakers exploit bettor sentiment
by adjusting their odds accordingly. Analogous to sentimental investors in financial
markets, sentimental bettors prefer bets with particular characteristics, e.g., bets on
the team they support, and do not necessarily choose the bets with the highest ex-
6pected return. Those preferences lead to an asymmetric volume demand even when
the bookmakers’ odds reflect the true winning probability of the underlying event.
Bookmakers can react to asymmetric volume demand in three different ways: They
can either lengthen or shorten the odds of the more heavily demanded bet or they
can refrain from price adjustments and set unbiased odds that provide equal betting
returns for all outcomes of the underlying event.
Unlike most previous studies, which rely on proxy measures for sentimental betting
demand, we use actual bookmaker betting volume data to analyze the effect of bettor
sentiment on bookmaker pricing. In particular, we investigate betting returns and
volume percentages of the popular over/under 2.5 goals betting market on soccer
matches. This market offers ideal research conditions. Because matches with a high
number of total goals are generally more attractive than matches with few or no goals,
bettors exhibit a natural preference for high match scores (Paul & Weinbach, 2002;
Woodland & Woodland, 2010). At the same time, the empirical winning probability
for either bet to win is close to 50%, because the average score of a soccer match lies
between 2.4 and 2.6 goals (Norman, 2011). Therefore, potential risk considerations
of bettors and bookmakers that could interfere with our results are negligible in this
setting.
We find that the betting volume is highly concentrated on the over 2.5 goals bet,
accounting for over 80% of the betting volume on average. However, this imbalance
is not associated with systematic sentimental biases in bookmaker pricing and bettor
returns. One possible explanation for this finding is that bettors can easily compare
the odds listed by several different bookmakers, which increases the bettors’ price
sensitivity. Thus, small price changes tend to have a large impact on the betting
volume and eventually on the bookmaker’s profit. If a bookmaker shortens the odds of
7the over 2.5 goals bet, sentimental bettors would switch to a competitor. Otherwise,
if a bookmaker lengthens the odds of the over 2.5 goals bet, he gains additional
sentimental betting volume, however, at a higher risk of substantial losses.
This paper demonstrates that sentimental preferences are widespread in betting
markets and bookmakers are well aware of their presence. However, as we are unable
to detect a bias in the odds and thus fail to reject market efficiency, sentimental prefer-
ences do not necessarily reduce market efficiency if competition and price transparency
are high.
The fourth paper, Liquidity, Market Efficiency and the Influence of Noise Traders:
Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Betting Industry (see Appendix A.4), investi-
gates the effect of liquidity on market efficiency and the role of noise traders in the
order-driven market. An understanding of the impact of liquidity on market efficiency
has important implications for policy makers and regulators, whose actions affect liq-
uidity. From a theoretical perspective, two hypotheses have evolved. On the one
hand, liquidity could increase market efficiency due to lower transaction costs, which
facilitates the elimination of mispricings (O’Hara, 1995). On the other hand, liquid-
ity due to irrational noise traders could decrease market efficiency because rational
agents are unable to fully offset noise traders’ biases (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, &
Waldmann, 1990). The aim of this paper is to test these competing hypotheses.
Empirical financial studies face two major limitations when investigating the rela-
tion between liquidity and market efficiency. First, fundamental values of traditional
financial products are not observable, which hinders the measurement of market ef-
ficiency. Second, the amount of liquidity is an endogenous function of the pricing
accuracy (Tetlock, 2008).
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the relation between liq-
8uidity and market efficiency in the order-driven betting exchange Betfair. In this
setting, the fundamental values of the betting contracts are revealed at a predeter-
mined point in time and different minimum tick sizes create exogenous variation in
liquidity. Moreover, we are able to test the influence of noise trader liquidity by an-
alyzing the effect of liquidity on market efficiency for weekend and weekday matches
separately. Earlier studies (e.g., Kopelman & Minkin, 1991; Sobel & Raines, 2003)
have shown that betting activity at weekend matches is characterized by a higher
share of irrational noise bettors than betting activity at weekday matches.
Using betting contracts on 2,227 soccer matches played in the English Premier
League from 2006-2011 and in the Spanish Primera Diviso´n from 2009-2011, our
results show that liquidity significantly decreases market efficiency for bets on weekend
matches but not for bets on weekday matches. Therefore, our findings indicate that
liquidity with a high fraction of noise bettors decreases market efficiency, whereas
liquidity with a low fraction of noise bettors is not significantly related to market
efficiency. As such, the type of liquidity seems to matter for market efficiency.
We have shown that noise trader liquidity can destabilize prices and harm market
efficiency. Whereas the mispricing period in betting markets is limited by the end of
the match, mispricing periods due to noise trader liquidity can last much longer in
financial markets (De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Thus, the risk of
noise traders in harming market efficiency in financial markets might be even more
severe than previously suggested.
Overall, this dissertation exploits the similarities between financial markets and
betting markets while taking advantage of the unique peculiarities of the latter. From
the analysis of this environment we draw important conclusions about the functioning
9of the quote-driven and the order-driven market structures. In particular, three major
contributions to the literature arise from this dissertation.
First, the order-driven market structure exhibits higher market efficiency than the
quote-driven market structure, which suggests that order-driven markets perform bet-
ter in aggregating diverse information. However, quote-driven markets offer a distinct
liquidity advantage that enables them to remain competitive against the order-driven
structure. In periods when liquidity at the order-driven market is low, bid and ask
quotations are wide apart. This results in high transaction costs and thus less com-
petitive prices at the order-driven market compared to the quote-driven market. Our
findings contribute as explanations of the ongoing coexistence of market structures
and the tendency toward hybrid market structures that combine the advantages of
the quote-driven and the order-driven structures.
Second, betting markets are characterized by the presence of strong sentimental
preferences of bettors. However, even though the incoming betting volume demand is
highly concentrated on one particular betting contract, we find that bookmakers offer
unbiased odds and bettor returns. Hence, the presence of sentimental preferences does
not necessarily translate into lower market efficiency as suggested by various previous
studies.
Third, the type of liquidity seems to matter for market efficiency in the order-
driven market structure where liquidity is provided entirely by market participants.
Liquidity with a higher fraction of noise traders is found to harm market efficiency,
whereas liquidity with a lower fraction of noise traders has no effect on market ef-
ficiency. Therefore, decisions of regulators and policy makers that increase market
liquidity should take account of the possibility that additional liquidity may be char-
10
acterized by noise traders whose entry into the market causes prices to diverge from
fundamental values.
These studies using betting markets as a valuable test environment have enabled
us to shed light on several open questions in the financial literature. Moreover, our
findings lay the ground for future research in various directions.
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A Appendix: Papers included in this Dissertation

A.1
The Impact of Market Structures on Market
Efficiency: Evidence from the Betting Industry*
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the market microstructure on market
efficiency based on data from the betting industry. Similar to financial mar-
kets, betting markets are characterized by the coexistence of a quote-driven
market structure (bookmakers) and an order-driven market structure (betting
exchanges). We show that the quote-driven market exhibits lower market effi-
ciency than the order-driven market. Taking advantage of the inefficient odds
available at the quote-driven market leads to above-average, and in some cases
even positive bettor returns.
JEL Classification: D40, G14
Keywords: Market Structure, Market Efficiency, Betting Market
*This paper has been written jointly with Stephan Nu¨esch and Egon Franck.
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1 Introduction
Worldwide, both quote-driven and order-driven market structures coexist in financial
markets. In the quote-driven structure (dealer market), a market maker posts prices
before order submission and takes the opposite side of each transaction. Specialists
intermediate between buyers and sellers by posting the bid and ask price that they
are willing to accept (Harris, 2003). In the order-driven structure (auction market),
however, buy and sell orders are directly matched between investors. The order-driven
system usually operates as a platform on which a continuous double auction process
between individual traders is enabled. Hybrid market structures combine elements of
both the quote-driven and the order-driven structure and allow orders from individual
traders to compete with quotes from dealers (De Jong & Rindi, 2009).
The impact of the market structure on market efficiency is an ongoing debate in
the market microstructure literature. Studies attempting to answer the question of
whether intermediaries increase or decrease market efficiency in financial markets have
produced weak and/or inconsistent results (Madhavan, 1992; Biais, 1993; Masulis &
Shivakumar, 2002; Theissen, 2000; Bennett & Wei, 2006; Anand & Subrahmanyam,
2008). Empirical studies testing the comparative market efficiency across different
market structures face two major difficulties. First, an objective benchmark against
which a price can be evaluated is missing because the true fundamental value of an
asset is not revealed within a finite time frame. Second, comparisons in the mar-
ket microstructure are often accompanied by differences in underlying assets and/or
different macroeconomic conditions.
We utilize the European betting industry to investigate the comparative market
efficiency across order-driven and quote-driven market structures. Similar to financial
17
markets, the betting industry likewise exhibits a coexistence of market structures. The
traditional form of European gambling is bookmaker betting. In this structure, the
bookmakers (e.g., William Hill, Ladbrokes) act as dealers posting the odds at which
the bettors can place their bets. In recent years, betting exchanges have evolved
as a popular alternative betting structure. Betting exchanges (e.g., Betfair, Betdaq)
provide an electronic platform on which bettors can directly trade bets with each
other. The European betting industry is particularly convenient for testing market
efficiency across market structures, because the same betting contracts are traded in
both quote-driven and order-driven market structures. Additionally, betting contracts
are characterized by a well-defined termination point at which the true fundamental
value is readily revealed (Vaughan Williams, 1999).
Previous studies that have addressed the comparative market efficiency of the dif-
ferent market structures concluded that the bookmaker market exhibits lower market
efficiency than the betting exchange market (Smith, Paton, & Vaughan Williams,
2006, 2009; Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2010). However, these studies mainly inves-
tigated the market efficiency of the two markets separately and compared different
goodness-of-fit measures across the two market structures. This paper provides a new
test of the comparative market efficiency across market structures and uses a larger
data set than any of the previous studies.
Using a sample of matched odds from several major bookmakers and the largest
betting exchange Betfair for more than 9,500 games played in the top five European
soccer leagues, we show that the betting exchange market outperforms the bookmaker
market in terms of market efficiency. In particular, we find that the price difference
between the two market structures contains relevant information, which is not fully
captured in the bookmakers’ odds. However, the betting exchange’s odds already
18
reflect the information contained in the price difference. Thus, the informational
content of the odds is larger at the betting exchange than at the bookmaker market,
implying that the order-driven market structure exhibits lower market efficiency. By
taking advantage of the inefficient odds available at the quote-driven market, we
conduct a simple betting strategy which leads to above-average, and in some cases
even positive bettor returns.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes
our data. Section 4 estimates the comparative efficiency based on the informational
content of the price differences between the two market structures and tests a simple
betting strategy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The hypothesis of market efficiency introduced by Fama (1991) states that current
prices of assets fully reflect all available information. Within the market microstruc-
ture literature, this has raised the question of how market structure influences market
efficiency. However, the findings are widely inconsistent. The theoretical model of
Madhavan (1992) predicts that the quote-driven and the order-driven system are
equally efficient with free entry into market making, whereas Biais (1993) concludes
that dealer markets are less efficient than auction markets. As no direct measure of
market efficiency is available, previous studies mainly focused on differences in market
quality such as the bid-ask spread (Madhavan, 2000). Despite the challenging compar-
ison due to different assets traded at each market structure or identical assets traded
in different economic environments, the bid-ask spread, used as a measure of execution
costs, has found to be generally lower in order-driven markets (e.g., De Jong, Nijman,
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& Roell, 1995; Huang & Stoll, 1996, 2001). Other empirical studies address market
efficiency explicitly. The study of Masulis and Shivakumar (2002) shows that prices of
NASDAQ stocks (dealer market at that time) adjust quicker to new information than
prices of NYSE stocks (auction market at that time). This is in line with the findings
of Anand and Subrahmanyam (2008), who state that intermediaries in dealer markets
contribute to better price discovery and market efficiency in financial markets. Con-
trariwise, Bennett and Wei (2006) show that market efficiency improves when stocks
switch their listings from a dealer to an auction market. Moreover, Theissen (2000)
compares auction and dealer markets within an experimental asset market. He con-
cludes that asset prices in the continuous auction market are closer to the true value
than prices in the dealer market.
Although tests of market efficiency across different market structures are much
more convenient in betting markets than in financial markets (Vaughan Williams,
1999), only a limited number of studies have addressed the relative market efficiency
in betting markets as yet.
Smith et al. (2006, 2009) compare traditional bookmaker odds and Betfair odds
using UK horse racing data. They show that the favorite-longshot bias is stronger at
the bookmaker market than at the betting exchange market. Franck et al. (2010) use
odds information of 5,478 matches played in European soccer leagues to compare the
market efficiency of bookmaker odds and betting exchange odds. They find that the
betting exchange market provides more accurate predictions of a given event than the
bookmaker market. This paper is the first to test whether price differences between
the two markets have additional explanatory power on bettor returns beyond the
bookmaker and betting exchange prices. In addition, we use a much larger data set
than any of the previous studies.
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3 Sample and Data
Our sample consists of 9,562 matches played in the top five European soccer leagues,
namely in the English Premier League, Spanish Primera Diviso´n, Italian Serie A, Ger-
man Bundesliga and French Ligue 1, during the six seasons from 2004/05 to 2009/10.
For each match, we collect data on pre-play odds offered by the bookmakers B365,
Gamebookers, Interwetten, Ladbrokes, Sportingbet, Stan James, Victor Chandler and
William Hill from http://football-data.co.uk. These odds are recorded on Friday
afternoon for weekend games and Tuesday afternoon for midweek games.
An obvious choice for the betting exchange is Betfair, because it is by far the
largest and most liquid betting exchange. In the year 2010, Betfair had more than 3
million registered customers and processed more than 6 million transactions per day
on average, more transactions than all European stock exchanges combined (Betfair,
2010). Betfair’s liquidity is illustrated by the average volume per game of $6.5 million
that was traded in the English Premier League over the 2009/2010 season. The Betfair
data is taken from http://data.betfair.com and contains matched odds, traded volume
and the number of bets on each team.
To approximate the time frame in which the bookmaker odds are taken, we calcu-
late the volume-weighted odds for all odds matched by Friday or Tuesday afternoon.1
Additionally, we calculate the volume traded and the number of bets settled by Friday
or Tuesday afternoon. Finally, we record the actual outcome of each match to record
whether a bet was successful or not.
A full sample of all matches played within these seasons would consist of 10,956
matches. Our dataset exhibits omissions due to the following reasons: First, either
1Even though we cannot merge the odds at exactly the same point of time, this should not affect
our results, as pre-play price drifts within this short time frame are unlikely to be systematic.
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bookmaker odds or Betfair odds are missing in our data source; such missing values
seem to be sporadic and not systematically related to certain leagues, teams and
seasons. As some bookmakers do not offer odds for all seasons considered, the sample
size for an individual bookmaker ranges from 7,988 to 9,562 matches. Second, as the
data is collected rather a long time before kick-off, some events exhibit low liquidity
at Betfair. This may result in inaccurate odds and we drop all matches with a trading
volume lower than £100. About 13% of matches are missing from our dataset for one
of these two reasons.
The odds collected are quoted as decimal odds which denote the payoff of a suc-
cessful bet. For example, if the odds quoted on the home team are 1.60, a one dollar
wager pays $1.60 and yields a return of 60% if the home team wins. Therefore, higher
odds imply a higher payoff in the case of success. However, the winning probability
of such bets is correspondingly lower. For each bet i and bookmaker j we transform
the quoted odds into prices by calculating
BM Pi,j =
1
oddsi,BMj
and BF Pi =
1
oddsi,BF,c
=
1
(oddsi,BF − 1) · (1− c) + 1 (1)
where BM denotes the bookmaker market and BF the betting exchange, respectively.
We adjust the betting exchange odds by subtracting the standard Betfair commission
c of 5% that is charged on net winnings. This makes the odds directly comparable
to the bookmaker odds, which already include the bookmaker’s margin. The prices
of both market structures are now standardized between zero and one and indicate
how much a bettor has to invest in order to collect $1 in the event of a successful bet
(Forrest & Simmons, 2008). Put differently, the lower the price of a bet on the same
outcome, the less a bettor has to pay for the chance of winning $1. We do not adjust
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these prices to ensure that they sum to one as suggested in previous studies (e.g.,
Forrest & Simmons, 2008; Franck et al., 2010). Such a margin correction assumes
that the overround is distributed proportionally depending on the odds of the home
win, draw and away win bets. However, if this is not the case, this procedure distorts
the prices by construction. For example, if a bookmaker has a lower margin on the
favorite team, a margin correction would lead to a self-induced favorite-longshot bias.2
Figure 1 depicts the Kernel density of average bookmaker and Betfair prices. The
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Figure 1: Kernel density of bookmaker and Betfair prices
average bookmaker’s price density is shifted to the right, implying that less favorable
odds (and therefore higher prices) are offered by the bookmaker in general. However,
as the price (and thereby the winning probability) of a team increases, the prices of
2An estimation of our models based on margin corrected bookmaker odds does not change our
findings. As expected, however, the effects tend to be even more pronounced.
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the two market structures appear to be fairly close. The fact that price differences are
related to price levels is puzzling, because we would expect that the price difference
would be independent of the price level.
4 Price Deviations and Market Efficiency
Within this section two simple tests of comparative market efficiency across the quote-
driven and the order-driven market are conducted. First, we test whether one market
structure’s price contains relevant information regarding the outcome that is not al-
ready included in the other market structure’s price. Second, we test whether the
information contained in the price deviation is able to substantially affect actual re-
turns. Therefore, we take the price difference of the two market structures for the
very same bet and test the informational content of this difference. In order to mea-
sure this price difference, we define for each bet i and bookmaker j the price ratio
PRATIO as
PRATIOi,j =
BM Pi,j
BF Pi
(2)
If the PRATIO is > 1, the offered prices from bookmaker j are higher than the
prices available at the betting exchange and vice versa. If the PRATIO is equal
to 1, the prices of the two market structures are identical. Simply stated, the lower
this ratio, the better (i.e., lower) the bookmaker’s prices. Figure 2 plots the price
ratio from the average bookmaker price and the Betfair price against the mid-price
of that bet, i.e., the price exactly midway between the Betfair price and the average
of the bookmaker prices. The price differences vary systematically and are larger for
low probability outcomes compared to high probability outcomes. To test market
efficiency across the two market structures, we estimate several linear probability
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models using the actual outcome of a bet, which is either a win (1) or a loss (0), as the
dependent variable.3 We include the price of the corresponding market structure and
the PRATIO as independent variables. For the bookmaker market, we include the
price of a randomly chosen bookmaker.4 To ensure independence across observations,
we estimate the model for home win, draw and away win bets separately. The results
of these models are reported in Table 1. Column (1) shows that the coefficient of
the PRATIO variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.1% level for
home win bets. This implies that the price difference contains additional information
which is not fully covered by the bookmaker price. By contrast, Column (2) suggests
3Alternatively, we also tested logit and probit models. All three specifications lead to the same
conclusion.
4The main results are not sensitive to the random bookmaker specification. Estimations for each
individual bookmaker lead to similar results.
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Table 1: Price deviations and market efficiency
Dependent variable: outcome (1/0)
Home win Draw Away win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
random BM P 0.960*** 1.074*** 0.973***
(0.031) (0.105) (0.034)
BF P 1.007*** 1.194*** 1.021***
(0.032) (0.115) (0.035)
PRATIO -0.326*** -0.058 -0.165** 0.090 -0.108*** -0.0001
(0.063) (0.067) (0.061) (0.073) (0.023) (0.024)
R2 11.19% 11.24% 1.38% 1.41% 11.06% 11.23%
N 9,562 9,562 9,562 9,562 9,562 9,562
Notes: The table presents linear probability model estimates for the actual outcome of a bet (0/1).
BM P and BF P reflect the prices by a random bookmaker and Betfair, respectively. The standard
commission of 5% for betting exchange winnings is included in the prices. PRATIO is defined as
BM P divided by BF P . The bookmakers in the sample are Bet365, Gamebookers, Interwetten,
Ladbrokes, Sportingbet, Stan James, Victor Chandler and William Hill. The heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
that PRATIO has no explanatory power when the price of the betting exchange is
included. At the bookmaker market, PRATIO contains additional explanatory power
beyond the bookmaker price, whereas the Betfair price already reflects the available
relevant information contained in the price difference. The results for the draw bets
specification in Columns (3) and (4) as well as the estimation results for away win bets
of Columns (5) and (6) are in line with our results from home win bets. Therefore,
the bookmaker market exhibits lower market efficiency than the order-driven betting
exchange. About 11% of the variation in the outcome can be explained by the prices
and the price difference for home and away win bets. The variation explained by
the model is much lower for draw bets, which is in line with Dobson and Goddard
(2001), who state that the draw appears to be a rather random event. Overall, the
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price difference has highly significant explanatory power in the quote-driven market,
but no explanatory power in the order-driven market.
Our second test for the comparative market efficiency is an examination of returns.
According to Vaughan Williams (1999), no historical information should systemati-
cally yield abnormal returns. This also implies that the price difference to the other
market structure should have no effect on actual returns. Therefore, for each market
structure we regress the ex-post returns on the ex-ante prices and the price ratios.
The results are reported in Table 2. Again, we observe a consistent pattern for home
Table 2: Effect of price deviations on returns
Dependent variable: return
Home win Draw Away win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
random BM P -0.091 0.634 0.265*
(0.102) (0.404) (0.128)
BF P -0.063 0.872 0.235
(0.114) (0.496) (0.150)
PRATIO -1.035*** -0.384 -0.581** 0.306 -0.705*** -0.332
(0.207) (0.279) (0.221) (0.313) (0.119) (0.188)
R2 0.51% 0.05% 0.17% 0.04% 0.80% 0.2%
N 9,562 9,562 9,562 9,562 9,562 9,562
Notes: The table presents regression estimates for the return on home win, draw and away win
bets. BM P and BF P reflect the actual prices offered by a random bookmaker and Betfair,
respectively. PRATIO is defined as BM P divided by BF P . The standard commission of 5%
for betting exchange winnings is included in the prices. The bookmakers in the sample are Bet365,
Gamebookers, Interwetten, Ladbrokes, Sportingbet, Stan James, Victor Chandler and William Hill.
The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
win, draw and away win bets. Whereas at the betting exchange no variable affects the
returns, higher values of PRATIO significantly decrease the returns at the bookmaker
market, documenting that the bookmaker prices are less informationally efficient.
Consequently, the results presented in this section suggest that the order-driven
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market is superior with respect to comparative market efficiency. We have shown that
in the quote-driven market the price ratio provides valuable information for predicting
the outcome as well as the actual returns of a bet. At the order-driven market however,
this ratio provides no additional information for predicting either the outcome or the
return of a bet.
To investigate how far bookmaker prices deviate from efficient prices, we conduct
a simple betting strategy based on inter-market price deviations. Whenever a book-
maker offers a more favorable price than the betting exchange, we place a bet on this
particular outcome at the best available bookmaker price. The expected returns of
this strategy for home and away win bets are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Simple betting strategy on price deviation
Expected return N SE t-statistic p-value (t)
Home win 4.40% 1,481 0.027 1.62 0.053
Away win -0.81% 855 0.048 -0.17 0.656
Notes: The table reports the expected returns of a simple betting strategy on outcomes for which
the most attractive bookmaker offers more favorable prices than the betting exchange.
Based on our data, such a betting strategy would generate an expected return
of 4.40% on home win bets and -0.81% on away win bets. Even though away win
bets do no generate positive returns, they are still highly above the average return of
-11.55% for a randomly placed away win bet.
5 Conclusion
This study uses the betting industry as a convenient laboratory for financial markets
to contribute to the ongoing debate on the market efficiency of quote-driven and
order-driven market structures. Whereas empirical tests on the comparative market
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efficiency of those two markets structures are complex in financial markets, this task
is rather simple in betting markets. Because the true value of a bet is revealed after
each match and identical bets on the same underlying match are available at both
market structures, we are able to evaluate the comparative market efficiency. In
particular, we test whether the price difference of the two markets provides additional
information which is not already incorporated in the price offered. We show that the
price difference, which is publicly available information, systematically predicts the
outcome of a match at the quote-driven market, but not at the order-driven market.
Similarly, the information contained in the price difference is valuable for generating
abnormal returns at the quote-driven structure, but not at the order-driven structure.
This clearly demonstrates the inferiority of the quote-driven structure compared to
the order-driven structure in terms of market efficiency.
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A.2
The Liquidity Advantage of Quote-driven Markets:
Evidence from the Betting Industry*
Abstract
This paper investigates the puzzling coexistence of the quote-driven market
structure characterized by traditional bookmakers and the order-driven market
structure characterized by betting exchanges in the betting industry. Even
though betting exchanges are considered as the superior business model due to
less operational risk and lower information costs, bookmakers continue to be
successful. We show that liquidity, which is only guaranteed at the bookmaker
market, significantly improves the bookmakers’ price competitiveness. Using
matched panel data of both bookmaker and betting exchange odds for over
17,000 soccer matches played worldwide, we find that a major bookmaker offers
more favorable odds than a major betting exchange in the early pre-play betting
period and less favorable odds shortly before match start.
JEL Classification: D40, L10, L83
Keywords: Market Structure, Market Performance, Liquidity, Betting Market
*This paper has been written jointly with Stephan Nu¨esch and Egon Franck.
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the betting industry has been characterized by
the coexistence of quote-driven and order-driven markets. Similar to intermediary
market makers in quote-driven financial markets, bookmakers operate on their own
account and quote betting odds at which bettors can place their bets (Croxson &
Reade, 2011). In the order-driven market, betting exchanges serve as a market place
where buy and sell orders are directly matched between bettors in a continuous double
auction, without intermediaries (De Jong & Rindi, 2009).
This coexistence of market structures is puzzling. Even though betting exchanges
offer superior odds and returns to bettors (Ozgit, 2005; Croxson & Reade, 2011),
face less operational risk (Koning & van Velzen, 2009), have lower information costs
(Davies, Pitt, Shapiro, & Watson, 2005) and exhibit higher prediction accuracy in
their odds (Smith, Paton, & Vaughan Williams, 2006, 2009; Franck, Verbeek, &
Nu¨esch, 2010), bookmakers continue to be successful. Namely, bookmakers have
not only managed to survive but have also generated considerable growth in net
revenues. For example William Hill and Ladbrokes, two major bookmakers in the
United Kingdom, increased their net sportsbook revenues from £42m to £166.7m
(+297%) and from £61.7m to £77.8m (+26%) respectively, between 2008 and 2012.
Previous studies have, either explicitly or implicitly, suggested several explana-
tions of why bookmakers remain competitive. One explanation is that by actively
managing quotes, bookmakers exploit bettor sentiment (e.g., Levitt, 2004; Forrest
& Simmons, 2008; Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2011). The presence of sentimental
bettors with preferences for bets with particular characteristics, e.g., betting on pop-
ular teams, results in an asymmetric volume demand. A bookmaker can exploit this
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sentiment by intentionally shading the odds for highly demanded bets and thereby
increasing his profit. Furthermore, Franck, Verbeek, and Nu¨esch (2013) argue that
because the identity of the bettors is known to the bookmakers, they are able to
anticipate the future trading behavior of their customers. Therefore, bookmakers
sometimes offer better odds than betting exchanges to acquire new customers. Once
an account is opened with a bookmaker, bettors face switching costs to transfer their
custom to a betting exchange and continue to place their bets at the bookmaker even
under unfavorable conditions, which overcompensates the initial discount offered by
the bookmaker. Croxson and Reade (2011) argue that learning costs from the new
interface of betting exchanges and efforts undertaken by bookmakers to retain their
customers provide a plausible explanation for the continuing survival of bookmakers.
Finally, Ozgit (2005) provides an order-size explanation. By analyzing the limit order
book of a betting exchange, he observes that execution costs rise sharply and that the
higher returns vanish as the order size gets larger. Thus, bettors with high bankrolls
will prefer to place their bets with bookmakers.
In this paper we suggest the liquidity advantage of the quote-driven bookmaker
market as an alternative explanation for the coexistence of both market structures. In
particular we test how liquidity affects the relative competitiveness of the bookmaker
market and the betting exchange market.
From a theoretical perspective, Demsetz (1968) argues that a crucial role of the
market maker in a quote-driven financial market is the continuous provision of liquid-
ity. By guaranteeing market liquidity at the prices quoted, the market maker fills the
gap that arises from asynchronous order arrival of buyers and sellers. Hence, the mar-
ket maker facilitates the rapidity of exchange by offering narrow bid-ask spreads. In
order-driven markets, however, liquidity is provided by the flow of orders from market
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participants (De Jong & Rindi, 2009). Here, a lack of liquidity due to an absence of
two-sided trading interest or asynchronously arriving orders might result in bid and
ask prices that are far apart. In such periods, order-driven markets perform poorly
as transaction costs increase due to wide jumps in prices (Demsetz, 1968).
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Ozgit, 2005; Franck et al., 2010; Croxson & Reade,
2011) that compared the odds from top-division leagues or large tournaments collected
at a single point in time shortly before match start, this paper uses an extensive panel
data set. The data covers over 17,000 soccer matches played worldwide with odds
information from the bookmaker Tipico and the betting exchange Betfair over the 72
hours before match start. We find that bookmaker odds are significantly higher than
betting exchange odds until 6 hours before match start for home win bets and until
3.5 hours before match start for away win bets. Thereafter, the bookmaker odds are
significantly lower. Thus, the bookmaker is more competitive during earlier stages of
the pre-play period whereas the betting exchange is more competitive shortly before
match start.
The liquidity at the betting exchange significantly affects the odds differences.
High liquidity at the betting exchange decreases the relative price competitiveness
of the quote-driven market. However, if liquidity at the betting exchange is low,
the quote-driven bookmaker market offers more favorable odds. Hence, the lack of
liquidity leads to a lower price competitiveness at the order-driven market compared
to the quote-driven market with unrestricted liquidity. Our findings are robust to a
subsample analysis that considers only matches played in the 10 most popular leagues
in the world, which are likely to attract a lion’s share of the total betting volume.
Our evidence for the liquidity advantage of quote-driven market structures in the
betting industry provides an additional explanation of the coexistence of bookmak-
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ers and betting exchanges. The liquidity advantage also rationalizes the decision of
Betfair to start offering quoted odds in addition to the exchange based odds as of
February 2013 (Betfair, 2013a). Our findings also help to explain the recent shift
in financial market structures from pure quote-driven or pure order-driven structures
into hybrid structures which combine the advantages of both models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
two market structures in the betting industry in more detail and review the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature. In Section 3, we describe our data set containing
odds of soccer matches available over the 72 hours before match start. Section 4
presents the empirical analysis of the differences in price competitiveness between the
two market structures. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Betting Industry
Similar to conventional assets and derivatives in financial markets, a bet is a state-
contingent contractual claim on some future cash flow. This cash flow is determined
by two parameters: (i) the outcome of the underlying event, such as a horse race, a
soccer match or a political election, and (ii) the price of the contract, i.e., the posted
odds (Sauer, 1998). Currently, the most common betting type is fixed-odds betting
where the cash flow of a successful bet is determined ax-ante. For example, if the
decimal odds on the home team of a soccer match are 1.40, a one dollar wager pays
$1.40 and yields a return of 40% if the home team wins. Therefore, higher odds imply
a higher payoff in the case of success but an accordingly lower winning probability.
Traditionally, betting markets were operated by bookmakers. Similar to market
makers in financial markets, bookmakers serve as intermediaries between buyers (bet-
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tors willing to place a bet on a particular outcome) and sellers (bettors willing to
place a bet on the opposite outcome). The bookmakers unilaterally determine the
odds (i.e., the price) for a given betting contract at which they are willing to accept
bets (Harris, 2003). In this market, the bookmakers supply all the liquidity and the
transparency regarding the trading process is rather low as only the odds are publicly
known (De Jong & Rindi, 2009). The odds quoted by the bookmakers already con-
tain a commission or ‘overround’ which compensates them for providing liquidity and
bearing the risk of unfavorable outcomes. Examples of well-established bookmakers
are Bwin, Ladbrokes, Tipico and William Hill.
Since 2000, betting exchanges have evolved in the betting industry. They operate
as order-driven markets, where buyers and sellers trade directly with each other in
a continuous double auction without the intermediation of market makers. In this
market structure, bettors can provide or take liquidity. Bettors who provide liquidity
post a limit order which indicates the terms at which they will trade. However, the
execution takes place only if there is a corresponding order on the opposite side of
the market. Otherwise, the limit order is placed in the limit order book until it is
either executed or canceled. Bettors who take liquidity submit a market order which
is immediately executed at the best odds available (Harris, 2003; De Jong & Rindi,
2009). The transparency is higher at betting exchanges, as the limit order book is
publicly known and the trading volume as well as the last traded odds are recorded.
Betting exchanges facilitate trading activity by providing an electronic platform on
which supply and demand is matched and collect a commission on the net winnings
of successful bets (Franck et al., 2013). Examples of larger betting exchanges are
Betfair, Betdaq and World Bet Exchange.
Earlier studies which compare the two market structures suggest that the betting
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exchange market is superior to the traditional bookmaking market in several ways.
Koning and van Velzen (2009) argue that a fundamental advantage of betting ex-
changes is that they do not take any trading position. Because betting exchanges
just charge the winners a certain commission, a steady flow of income independent
from the match outcomes is guaranteed. This exposes betting exchanges to minimal
risk. In contrast, traditional bookmakers are continuously exposed to risk and lose on
some events when they misjudge the probabilities or when they are over-exposed to
the event that occurs (Davies et al., 2005). Furthermore, bookmakers need informed
specialists who monitor the market and actively manage the odds. Therefore, the
information costs of the bookmakers are considerably higher than those of betting
exchanges, which simply provide the trading platform (Davies et al., 2005).
The study of Ozgit (2005) investigates bookmaker and betting exchange odds of
623 matches from the National Basketball Association (NBA) and finds that the net
returns of bettors at the exchange are consistently higher. Similarly, Croxson and
Reade (2011) compare the odds from both market structures during 22 matches of
the Euro 2008 soccer championship and find superior returns at the betting exchange.
Moreover, Croxson and Reade (2011) show that the betting exchange provides
more accurate odds in terms of information efficiency than the bookmaker. Using
UK horse racing data, Smith et al. (2006) as well as Smith et al. (2009) compare the
odds from the betting exchange Betfair with odds from traditional bookmakers. They
find that betting exchange odds have more predictive value than the corresponding
bookmaker odds and exhibit a lower favorite-longshot bias5. The study of Franck et al.
(2010) compares the prediction accuracy of the odds from eight different bookmakers
to the corresponding betting exchange odds from Betfair on soccer matches played
5The favorite-longshot bias is the well-documented empirical regularity that favorites win more often
than implied by their odds and longshots win less often (Cain, Law, & Peel, 2000).
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in the top five European leagues. In line with the previous literature, the results
of a univariate probit regression and several goodness-of-fit measures reveal a clear
superiority of the betting exchange over the bookmaker market.
Given the arguments elaborated above, the ongoing success of the quote-driven
bookmaker structure is surprising. Madhavan (2000) argues that network externali-
ties due to the migration of trading volume to the market with lower costs should lead
to a consolidation into a single market structure. However, there are also some argu-
ments in the literature highlighting certain competitive advantages of the quote-driven
market structure.
One advantage of actively managed odds is rooted in the bookmaker’s profit max-
imizing response to incoming betting demand. When the incoming volume demand
is asymmetrically distributed due to sentimental preferences of bettors, bookmakers
can increase their profits by distorting their odds. Levitt (2004) demonstrates that
bettors have a systematic preference for favorite teams and shows that a monopo-
listic bookmaker for NFL games can substantially increase his profits by shortening
the odds for bets with a higher demand. By contrast, Forrest and Simmons (2008)
and Franck et al. (2011) find that bookmakers offer more favorable odds for bets on
popular teams. They argue that because demand in European betting is likely to be
elastic, a risk-neutral bookmaker is able to increase his profit by trading off margins
against the attraction of additional betting revenues. Whether bookmakers are able to
exploit bettor sentiment seems to depend on the betting environment. A recent study
of Flepp, Nu¨esch, and Franck (2014), for example, shows that bookmakers are not
exploiting bettor sentiment in the over/under 2.5 goals betting market, even though
the betting volume is highly concentrated on the over bet. In this setting, where risk
considerations of bettors and bookmakers are negligible, bookmakers offer equal re-
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turns for both outcomes and collect their margins accordingly. Likewise, Page (2009)
does not find any evidence of biased odds due to bettor sentiment.
Another advantage of the bookmaker market is the knowledge of the participants’
identity. According to Franck et al. (2013), this allows bookmakers to take the ex-
pected future trading behavior of their customers into account. Therefore, bookmak-
ers sometimes offer over-favorable odds as an element of their promotional activities
to attract new customers. Once bettors have opened an account, they tend to stick
with the given bookmaker even under unfavorable conditions. This pays off the ini-
tial ‘loss leader’ bet offered by the bookmaker. The intentionally distorted odds of
the bookmaker exhibit lower information efficiency than exchange-based odds, which
results in inter-market arbitrage opportunities in 19.2% of the matches in the top five
European soccer leagues considered.
Croxson and Reade (2011) hypothesize that bookmakers continue to be successful
because bettors face learning costs when switching to the betting exchange structure.
The exchange interface, with its limit order book, different odds and the options to
back (i.e., betting on a certain outcome) or lay (i.e., betting against a certain outcome)
a bet, may discourage bettors who are used to betting at a traditional bookmaker. At
the same time bookmakers offer incentives like free bets to dissuade customers from
leaving.
Ozgit (2005) provides a trade-size explanation. He argues that the superior net
returns found at the betting exchange do not account for the size of the wagers. He
finds that large wagers exceed the volume available at the best odds in the limit order
book. Thus, the remaining amount of the wager is executed at the second best or
third best odds, which eliminates the higher returns rapidly.
In this paper, we investigate a different source of competitive advantage for the
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quote-driven market structure: the benefit arising from the continuous liquidity provi-
sion of the bookmaker. According to Demsetz (1968), a key function of market makers
in financial markets is the supply of immediacy by continuously quoting prices and
providing liquidity to the asynchronous arrival of orders from investors. This presence
reduces temporal imbalances in order flow and increases the rapidity of exchange. By
contrast, a lack of liquidity at the order-driven structure normally provided by the
flow of orders from market participants leads to relatively high bid quotations and
relatively low ask quotations, which increases both transaction and waiting costs.
3 Sample and Data
Our data set consists of decimal betting odds from the bookmaker Tipico and the
betting exchange Betfair on the winner betting contracts on home win, draw and
away win of soccer matches. Tipico is one of the leading bookmakers in Europe.
Through its online portal and more than 1,000 betting shops across Europe, the
company offered odds on 1.76 million betting contracts and handled over 790 million
bets from customers in 2012 (Tipico Co. Ltd., 2013). Betfair is the largest and most
liquid betting exchange. In 2012, the betting exchange had over 4 million registered
customers and processed more than 7 million transactions on an average day, which is
more than the transactions of all European stock exchanges combined (Betfair, 2012).
The data is provided by Tipico and covers 17,689 matches from over 400 leagues
across more than 60 countries played between March 2012 and October 2012. Fig-
ure 1a highlights the countries represented in the data. Within each country, we
observe matches from different divisions. For example, data from England includes
matches from the Premier League (level 1), Championship (level 2), League One (level
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3), League Two (level 4), Conference National (level 5) and Conference North/South
(level 6) are available. Additionally, transnational tournaments such as the UEFA
Champions League or Europa League, World Cup qualification matches or interna-
tional friendly matches are also covered by the data set. Figure 1b displays the
distribution of matches across continents. The lion’s share of matches was played in
European leagues, accounting for over 12,000 matches.
(a) Countries covered by the data set
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(b) Number of matches across continents
Figure 1: Match coverage across countries and continents
We observed the decimal odds during the 72 hours before match start.6 The odds
information of the bookmaker and the betting exchange is taken simultaneously and
the time of collection is recorded accurately to the second. The frequency at which
the odds were collected depended on the time remaining until match start, ranging
from every 3 hours between 72 and 48 hours before match start to every 5 minutes
during the final 3 hours before match start. Table 1 shows the complete algorithm
according to which the odds information was collected. Normally, the actual time
point of the odds collection differs slightly from the defined algorithm. We round
6As not all matches have odds data available as early as 72 hours before play, a higher number of
matches are observed at shorter times before match start. For 72 hours before match start, we
observed 5,724 matches and at match start we observed 17,689 matches.
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Table 1: Odds collection algorithm
Hours before match start 72-48 48-15 15-6 6-3 3-0
Time between odds observations 3 hours 1 hour 15 minutes 10 minutes 5 minutes
Notes: The table shows the odds collection frequency algorithm according to which odds information
has been recorded.
those observation to the nearest timestamp according to the algorithm in order to
equalize all timestamps across the matches in the dataset.7
Figure 2 displays the odds information available for the home win bet from the
match of Liverpool vs. Manchester United played on September 23, 2012, clearly
showing how the frequency of observations increases as the time before match start
diminishes. This systematic applies to all matches in our dataset. In this example, the
bookmaker changes his quoted odds only once, whereas the odds available at Betfair
exhibit a higher variation. This pattern is typical for many matches in our data set:
while the bookmaker changes his odds about twice on average, the betting exchange
odds change about 31 times on average.
In total, we observe 1,875,430 pairs of odds from the bookmaker and the betting
exchange for each of the three events home win, draw and away win. Additionally, the
data set contains the cumulative trading volume per match at the betting exchange.
To accommodate differences between more and less heavily demanded matches
we form a subsample consisting of matches played only in the top 10 soccer leagues
in the world. These leagues include the 1. Bundesliga (Germany), Premier League
(England), La Liga (Spain), Serie A (Italy), Serie A (Brazil), Liga MX (Mexico),
MLS (USA), Eredivisie (Netherlands), Ligue 1 (France) and the Primera Division
7Note that this rounding procedure only affects the time point of the odds collection. The original
timestamps of Tipico and Betfair data are identical. For example, if the original timestamp is
48h2m31s before match start, the timstamp for this data pair is rounded to 48h0m0s.
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Figure 2: Decimal odds on home win bet (Liverpool vs. Manchester United, September 23, 2012)
(Argentina) (World Soccer, 2013). Matches played within those popular leagues are
likely to attract substantially higher betting volume at both market structures due
to a larger fan base, television broadcasts or media presence, for example. This
subsample consists of 1,441 matches, leading to 181,084 pairs of odds-observations
from the bookmaker and the betting exchange over the three-day period.
4 Empirical Analysis
Previous studies primarily relied on the comparison of odds from top-division leagues
and large tournaments collected at a single point in time shortly before match start.
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Our data set permits us to analyze the dynamics of price competitiveness over the 72
hours before match start and over a large scope of different leagues. We begin our
empirical analysis by assessing the relative competitiveness of the bookmaker and the
betting exchange market over time and proceed by studying the role of liquidity in
explaining the differences in price competitiveness.
4.1 Price Competitiveness
Our measurement of price competitiveness is based on the objective benchmark of
the odds. As identical betting contracts are offered on both market structures si-
multaneously, better odds should attract a higher number of bettors, ceteris paribus
(Pope & Peel, 1989; Croxson & Reade, 2011). For the ease of interpretation, we con-
vert the decimal odds into prices, which are the reciprocal of the decimal odds (e.g.,
p = 1
1.40
≈ 0.714). These prices represent the amount of money a bettor has to invest
in order to collect $1 for a winning bet (Forrest & Simmons, 2008). Hence, a lower
price for an identical betting contract is superior to a higher price.
In the bookmaker market, the commission is already included in the odds quoted
by the bookmaker. For each match i, event e ∈ {home win, draw, away win} and
time t before match start, the price offered by the bookmaker is defined as
piet,BM =
1
oddsiet,BM
(1)
where oddsBM refers to the decimal odds quoted by the bookmaker. Betting exchanges
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usually charge a commission on net winnings that is not included in the odds offered.
Hence, the net price at the betting exchange is calculated as
piet,BE =
1[
(oddsbackiet,BE − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net winnings
·(1− c)
]
+ 1
(2)
where oddsbackBE refers to the best decimal back odds, i.e., the odds of a bet on a
certain outcome, available at the betting exchange and c refers to the commission.
The commission at Betfair varies between 2% and 5% on net winnings, contingent on
the betting activity of a bettor. Thereby, the commission decreases the more money a
bettor has wagered in the past (Betfair, 2013b). In this paper, we employ the standard
commission of 5% to compute a lower bound for the net returns from Betfair.8
At each point in time, the prices from the two market structures are collected simul-
taneously. Therefore, we start our analysis by conducting a nonparametric Wilcoxon
signed-rank test of the net prices. Panel A of Table 2 reports the results for prices
collected 72 hours before match start for the home win, draw and away win events
separately. For all three events, the prices offered by the bookmaker are significantly
lower than the prices offered by the betting exchange. Thus, the bookmaker offers a
superior product to bettors at this point in time. The difference in prices is consid-
erable. On the home win event for example, the average prices from bookmaker and
the betting exchange are 0.469 and 0.510, respectively which results in an additional
average payout of the bookmaker to bettors of $0.17 for every dollar invested in case
8It is reasonable to assume that most of the bettors betting at Betfair are paying 5% in commission,
as a discount in the commission requires very high betting activity. According to the Betfair com-
mission rule, a bettor has to wager at least $112,500 per week in order to reach the 2% commission
rate (Betfair, 2013b).
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Table 2: Comparison of net prices
Panel A: Wilcoxon signed-rank test of net prices 72 hours before match start
Home win Draw Away win
pBM pBE z pBM pBE z pBM pBE z
Mean 0.469 0.510 -25.7*** 0.288 0.333 -30.3*** 0.319 0.365 -20.7***
SD 0.152 0.181 0.039 0.136 0.137 0.199
N 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724
Panel B: Wilcoxon signed-rank test of net prices at match start
Home win Draw Away win
pBM pBE z pBM pBE z pBM pBE z
Mean 0.483 0.473 56.3*** 0.277 0.268 67.4*** 0.331 0.324 54.2***
SD 0.176 0.175 0.046 0.059 0.164 0.167
N 17,689 17,689 17,689 17,689 17,689
Notes: The table presents the results of a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the difference
in net prices from the bookmaker (pBM ) and the betting exchange (pBE) indicated by the z-statistic.
Panel A shows the results three days before match start. Panel B shows the results at match start.
In all tests, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
of a successful bet.9 This results contradicts the findings from previous studies which
imply that prices from the betting exchange are always superior.
Panel B of Table 2 compares the prices at match start. Now, the prices offered
at the betting exchange are clearly superior to the prices offered by the bookmaker.
This finding is consistent for all three events within a match. The results from Table
2 provide first evidence that the prices offered by the bookmaker are competitive in
earlier stages of the pre-play betting period but not at match start.
To get a complete picture of the dynamic of price competitiveness we test the
difference in prices for each point in time available in the data set over the 72 hours
before match start. Figure 3 shows the average prices over time including 95% con-
9∆return = returnBM −returnBE =
[
( 1pBM )−1
]−[( 1pBE )−1] = [( 10.469 )−1]−[( 10.510 )−1] ≈ 0.17
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Figure 3: Prices from the bookmaker and the betting exchange over time (all leagues)
fidence bands resulting from simple t-tests. The bookmaker’s prices are consistently
more attractive over a long period of time during earlier stages in the pre-play period.
For the home win event (Figure 3a), the average prices of the bookmaker continue
to be significantly lower until about 6 hours before match start. During the 6 hours
before match start, the prices from the betting exchange improve dramatically and
offer better value than the bookmaker prices. A similar picture arises for the away
win event depicted in Figure 3b, with the switching point of price competitiveness
taking place about 3.5 hours before match start. The results for the draw event are
similar with a switching point of 3.3 hours before match start.
In a robustness check, we compare the net returns to bettors over time as an
alternative measure of price competitiveness. Again, we find that the bookmaker
market is more competitive in earlier betting periods, whereas the betting exchange
market offers superior value shortly before match start.
Next, we investigate the comparative price competitiveness within the subsample
of popular matches from the top 10 leagues worldwide. Price competitiveness is
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crucial for these matches, because they attract a large share of the betting volume
on soccer matches. Figure 4 displays the net prices over time for matches played
in the top 10 leagues. Again, the prices for the home win event (Figure 4a) are
significantly lower at the bookmaker market in the early betting period but higher
in the later betting period compared to the prices from the betting exchange. The
switching point, however, is shifted in time, with prices being superior at the betting
exchange from 34 hours before match start. A similar conclusion is drawn from the
draw event with a switching point at 47 hours before match start. For the away win
.
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Figure 4: Prices from the bookmaker and the betting exchange over time (top 10 leagues)
event (Figure 4b) the betting exchange prices are superior from 54 hours before match
start. Before this point of time, the bookmaker prices are lower than betting exchange
prices, however, the difference is not statistically significant.
Overall, a clear picture emerges from the comparison of the average net prices
over time. The bookmaker offers lower and thus more favorable prices to bettors in
earlier stages of the pre-play betting period. The price advantage of the bookmaker
is considerable, lasting on average until 6 hours before match start for home win bets
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and until 3.5 hours before match start for away win bets, respectively. Even for
matches played only in the top 10 leagues worldwide, the bookmaker price remains
competitive, although the switching point at which betting exchange prices become
superior occurs much earlier before match start. As such, bettors who do not want to
wait until shortly before match start to place their bets are better off betting at the
bookmaker market on average.
4.2 Liquidity Provision
Having considered the price competitiveness of the quote-driven bookmaker market
and the order-driven betting exchange, we proceed by studying the role of liquidity
as a moderating factor in explaining the dynamics of price competitiveness over time.
Liquidity is an important characteristic of well-functioning markets and permits the
trading of large quantities quickly at low costs (Harris, 2003). While liquidity in the
quote-driven market is guaranteed by the bookmaker, liquidity in the order-driven
market depends on the flow of orders from market participants (De Jong & Rindi,
2009). Hence, we concentrate on the development of betting exchange liquidity be-
cause a lack of liquidity in the order-driven market could affect the cost of immediacy
and thus the price competitiveness (Demsetz, 1968).
A common measure of liquidity in financial studies is the quoted spread (e.g.,
Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). The quoted spread is the difference between the lowest
ask price and the highest bid price (Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2008). A small
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quoted spread indicates high market liquidity, because the transaction costs are lower.
We calculate the quoted spread (QSPR) as
QSPRiet,BE =
1
oddsbackiet,BE
− 1
oddslayiet,BE
(3)
where oddsback refers to the best ask price and oddslay to the best bid price available
at the betting exchange.
Another measure of liquidity employed in the literature is the trading volume
(Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2001). Thus, we use the cumulative trading vol-
ume (V OL) per match as basis for our second liquidity proxy. Figure 5a displays
the development of liquidity based on the average quoted spread over the 72 hours
before match start for the three events separately. Interestingly, the quoted spreads
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Figure 5: Betting exchange liquidity over time
remain relatively stable until around 24 hours before match start. Thereafter, they
fall sharply, from an average quoted spread of 0.086 at 24 hours before match start to
0.025 at match start. A similar pictures arises for the liquidity based on the cumula-
tive trading volume over time (see Figure 5b). The trading volume remains low until
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around 24 hours before match start and increases exponentially thereafter. Given this
evolution of the trading volume, we use the logarithmized cumulative trading volume
(LnV OL) in our further analysis.
To investigate the relative price competitiveness we take the difference between
the bookmaker price and the betting exchange price offered at each point in time and
define this difference ∆p as
∆piet = piet,BM − piet,BE (4)
A positive value of ∆p indicates that the bookmaker offers a higher price and is less
competitive than the betting exchange. Conversely, a negative value of ∆p indicates
that the bookmaker market offers a lower price and is more competitive.
To examine the link between price competitiveness and liquidity, we estimate for
each event e the following fixed effects panel model
∆pit = αi + β1 · Liquidityit + β · Γit + it (5)
where Liquidity is either measured by the quoted spread (QSPR) or by the loga-
rithmized trading volume (LnV OL). To capture a possible time trend in the data
we include a set of hourly dummies (Γ) in the model. This allows us to control
for any time-related price differences in a flexible way. The constant αi controls for
time-constant differences across matches.
The estimation results based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation are presented in Table 3. Columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table
3 report the coefficients for the quoted spread of the home win, draw and away win
events, respectively. All three coefficients are negative on the 1% significance level. We
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Table 3: Fixed effects panel analysis of price differences (all leagues)
Dependent variable: ∆p
Home win Draw Away win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
QSPR -0.562*** -0.696*** -0.688***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
LnV OL 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F (56, 17,672) 492.78*** 70.81*** 1614.96*** 74.21*** 745.50*** 63.66***
R2 overall 70.37% 10.21% 88.42% 13.40% 78.11% 10.69%
N 1,857,741 1,857,741 1,857,741 1,857,741 1,857,741 1,857,741
N of groups 17,673 17,673 17,673 17,673 17,673 17,673
Notes: The table reports the coefficients estimated from a fixed effects panel model with standard
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. The dependent variable is the price difference ∆p between the two market structures. Matches
from all leagues in the data set are included for the estimation. In all models, *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
find that illiquidity (i.e., a higher quoted spread) significantly decreases the relative
price competitiveness at the betting exchange market. Columns (2), (4) and (6) of
Table 3 report the estimated coefficients for the trading volume. For each of the
three events, we find a positive effect of liquidity on the price difference, indicating
an improvement of the price competitiveness at the betting exchange relative to the
bookmaker market. In all models, dummy variables for each hour within the 72-
hour period control for a potential general time trend which could affect the price
differences.
Taken together, our findings imply that higher liquidity is associated with higher
price competitiveness at the betting exchange. In periods where liquidity is low at
the betting exchange, however, the guaranteed liquidity provision at the bookmaker
market leads to significantly more favorable prices.
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In order to investigate the robustness of our results we include the bookmaker
price pit,BM in Equation (5) as a control variable. The reasoning behind this is that
changes in the bookmaker price might influence the relation between liquidity and
the price difference. However, the previous findings do not change in any significant
way. Additionally, an estimation of Equation (5) with the difference between the net
returns to bettors from both market structures as dependent variable leads to the
same conclusion.
We extend our analysis by studying the effect of liquidity provision on price com-
petitiveness on the subsample consisting of matches from the top 10 leagues worldwide.
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table 4. The results from this estimation
are statistically very similar to those in Table 3. However, the effect from liquid-
ity on the price difference seems to be less pronounced, indicating that the liquidity
advantage of the bookmaker market is smaller for the very popular matches.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the coexistence of bookmakers and betting exchanges in the
betting industry. Said to exhibit superior odds, less operational risk, lower information
costs and higher prediction accuracy, betting exchanges are considered a superior
business model to traditional bookmaking. Nevertheless, bookmakers continue to be
successful.
We test how liquidity affects the relative price competitiveness of the two market
structures. Liquidity in the quote-driven market is continuously provided by the
bookmaker. However, liquidity in the order-driven market is determined by limit order
submissions from other bettors. We find that the bookmaker offers more favorable
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Table 4: Fixed effects panel analysis of price differences (top 10 leagues)
Dependent variable: ∆p
Home win Draw Away win
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
QSPR -0.497*** -0.499*** -0.665***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.041)
LnV OL 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005***
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Hourly dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F (56, 17,672) 24.87*** 6.69*** 22.98*** 10.70*** 28.08*** 7.02***
R2 overall 34.48% 0.57% 43.75% 2.16% 51.45% 0.59%
N 181,084 181,084 181,084 181,084 181,084 181,084
N of groups 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,441
Notes: The table reports the coefficients estimated from a fixed effects panel model with standard
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Standard errors are reported in paren-
theses. The dependent variable is the price difference ∆p between the two market structures. Only
matches from the top 10 leagues worldwide are included in the estimation. In all models, *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
prices than the betting exchange until 6 hours before match start for home win bets
and until 3.5 hours before match start for away win bets, and less favorable prices
thereafter. These price dynamics in the earlier betting period have been overlooked
by the literature so far.
A panel regression analysis demonstrates that the price competitiveness of the
betting exchange depends crucially on liquidity. Our results imply that a lack of
liquidity at the betting exchange causes large gaps between bid and ask prices and
thus less competitive betting exchange prices. In such situations, bookmaker prices
are superior because liquidity is permanently supplied by the bookmaker.
Altogether, our paper shows that the order-driven betting exchange structure is
not necessarily superior to the quote-driven bookmaker structure, as the active man-
agement of the sportsbook offers a distinct liquidity advantage. This finding helps to
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explain the ongoing coexistence of the two structures, as early betting volume should
migrate to the more competitive bookmaker market.
Our analysis sheds some light on the recent shift of financial markets into hybrid
structures. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Nasdaq market for exam-
ple, moved from quote-driven systems to a hybrid structure where the order book is
supplemented by market makers (Friederich & Payne, 2007). Furthermore, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is characterized by elements of both market structures
(Madhavan, 2000). Empirical financial studies suggest that market makers are par-
ticularly valuable in hybrid structures when liquidity at the order book is low (e.g.,
Madhavan & Sofianos, 1998; Friederich & Payne, 2007; Venkataraman & Waisburd,
2007). As such, the hybrid market structure combines the advantages of both the
quote-driven and order-driven structures. This might be one of the reasons why Bet-
fair has started a sportsbook offering quoted fixed odds in addition to the exchange
based odds as of February 2013 (Betfair, 2013a), moving essentially to a hybrid market
structure.
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A.3
Does Bettor Sentiment affect Bookmaker Pricing?*
Abstract
This paper uses bookmaker betting volume data to test the influence of bet-
tor sentiment on bookmaker pricing in the over/under 2.5 goals betting market.
In an average match, more than 80% of the volume wagered is concentrated on
the over bet as cheering for a high score is more attractive than betting against
it. We do not find that this volume imbalance is associated with systematic
biases in bettor returns. High price transparency seems to prevent bookmakers
from systematically distorting their odds in order to exploit bettor sentiment.
JEL Classification: D81, L83
Keywords: Sports Betting, Sentiment, Bookmaker Odds, Betting Volume
*The final version of this paper has been published in: Flepp, R., Nu¨esch, S., & Franck, E. (2014).
Does bettor sentiment affect bookmaker pricing? Journal of Sports Economics, 1-9.
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1 Introduction
Sports betting is a multi-billion dollar business. FIFA (2011) estimates that sports
betting generated between $350 billion and $400 billion in 2011 while the sports
industry itself generated around $300 billion. The dominant form of sports betting
is bookmaker betting. Bookmakers act as dealers by announcing the odds or point
spreads that reflect the prices against which bettors can place their bets. Thereby,
bookmakers enter the opposite position of each bet. As long as bettor preferences
and perceptions are unbiased, bookmakers do best by setting informationally efficient
odds that reflect the true winning probability of the underlying event. Otherwise,
bookmakers can sustain large losses if bettors are able to recognize and exploit the
biased odds (Levitt, 2004). In the presence of sentimental bettors who prefer bets
with particular characteristics and who do not necessarily choose the bets with the
highest expected return, optimal bookmaker pricing becomes more complex.
Popular examples of bettor sentiment include the optimistic/perception bias (e.g.,
Kuypers, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Page, 2009) which causes bettors to overrate the winning
probability of certain teams, and the loyalty bias (e.g., Forrest & Simmons, 2008;
Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2011) which prevents bettors from betting against the
team they support. Bettor sentiment leads to an asymmetric volume demand even
when the bookmaker odds reflect the true winning probability of the underlying event.
This paper tests whether and how bettor sentiment affects the pricing strategy of
bookmakers. Bookmakers can react to bettor sentiment and thus asymmetric volume
demand in three different ways: They can either lengthen or shorten the odds of
the more heavily demanded bet or they can refrain from price adjustments and set
unbiased odds that provide equal betting returns for all outcomes of the underlying
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event. Kuypers (2000) and Levitt (2004) argue that bookmakers can maximize their
profits by shortening the odds of the bet with the comparatively higher betting volume.
Alternatively, the model of Franck et al. (2011) shows that, given a highly elastic
demand, risk-neutral bookmakers could profit from lengthening the odds of the more
heavily demanded bet. The reasoning behind this pricing strategy is that the lower
but still positive margin on such bets is overcompensated by a vast additional betting
volume from price-sensitive bettors.
Empirical evidence on the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker odds is mixed.
Avery and Chevalier (1999), Levitt (2004), Paul and Weinbach (2007) and L. Wood-
land and Woodland (1994) show that the bettor returns are abnormally low for bets
with higher bettor sentiment. Forrest and Simmons (2008) and Franck et al. (2011),
however, find higher returns for bets with high bettor sentiment. And while Braun and
Kvasnicka (2013) find both upward and downward biases, Page (2009) does not find
any evidence of biased odds due to bettor sentiment. Hence, the cumulative evidence
on the effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing is weak and/or inconsistent.
One difficulty in establishing a link between bettor sentiment and bookmaker
pricing is that actual betting volume data is often missing. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to use actual bookmaker betting volume data to analyze the
effect of bettor sentiment on bookmaker pricing. Paul and Weinbach (2007, 2009)
use data on the percentage of betting volume from Sportsbook.com for the 2007 NFL
and NCAA season, while other studies by Paul and Weinbach (e.g., 2008, 2012) use
data on the relative number of bets placed from four online sportsbooks (BetUS.com,
CribSports.com, SportBet.com and Sportsbook.com) provided by Sportsinsights.com.
However, these studies mainly test whether bookmakers attempt to balance their
books in the point spread market. Furthermore, the relative number of bets placed is
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an imprecise measure of betting volume because it ignores the size of the wagers. We
use data on the actual percentage of betting volume of a large European bookmaker.
The previous sentimental preferences literature typically has only employed proxy
measures for sentimental betting demand such as the advice of experts, the historical
success or prestige of teams (Avery & Chevalier, 1999), the difference in mean home
attendance between the two opposing teams (Forrest & Simmons, 2008; Franck et al.,
2011) or the number of bets placed in a betting tournament with a fixed entry fee
(Levitt, 2004).
A second difficulty in establishing a link between bettor sentiment and bookmaker
pricing is that bettor sentiment is often correlated with other confounders such as
bettor risk or skewness preferences (Golec & Tamarkin, 1998; Quandt, 1986) and
bookmaker price adjustments due to the risk of the underlying event (Shin, 1991).
Thus, empirical patterns in betting markets such as the favorite-longshot bias, which
refers to the finding that the expected return of bets with a high winning probability
tends to be systematically higher than the return of bets with a low winning prob-
ability (see Sorensen & Ottaviani, 2008 for a survey) cannot be attributed solely to
bettor sentiment.
We investigate betting returns and volume percentages of the popular over/under
2.5 goals betting market on soccer matches.10 This market is beneficial for three
reasons. First, there are only two possible outcomes. An under 2.5 goals (hereafter
under) bet wins if the total score of the two teams is 2 or less and vice versa for
the over 2.5 goals (hereafter over) bet. Second, the average score of a soccer match
lies somewhere between 2.4 and 2.6 goals, depending on the league and competition
10The over/under 2.5 goals betting market is the second largest market after the winner market on
home win, draw or away win according to the Betfair volume data on soccer matches from the
2011/12 season of the English Premier League provided by fracsoft.com.
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(Norman, 2011). Thus, the empirical probability of winning is close to 50% for both
the over bet and the under bet, which indicates that potential risk considerations
of bettors and bookmakers are negligible. Third, the over/under 2.5 goals betting
market allows us to exploit a natural source of sentimental betting. Matches with a
high number of total goals are generally more attractive than matches with few or no
goals (Paul & Weinbach, 2002; B. Woodland & Woodland, 2010). As gambling is a
consumption good, some bettors may even be willing to sacrifice expected returns for
the inherent entertainment value of the bet (Conlisk, 1993). Cheering for an exciting
high-scoring match is more attractive than cheering for a dull low-scoring match and
the entertainment value is therefore certainly higher for the over 2.5 goals bet than
for the under 2.5 goals bet. Hence, at least part of the betting volume wagered on
the over bet is expected to be sentimentally driven due to this preference. All in all,
our setting allows a clean and simple analysis of whether and how bettor sentiment
affects bookmaker pricing.
2 Data and Method
We utilize data on the volume percentages of money wagered on each side of the
over/under 2.5 goals betting market. The betting volume data was provided by the
bookmaker Tipico, which is one of the leading sports betting vendors in Germany. In
addition to the online betting portal, Tipico has over 1,000 betting shops in several
European countries. The original data sample included 4,491 soccer matches played
worldwide in 220 different leagues and competitions between 1 November and 7 De-
cember 2011. The corresponding odds information was collected from the website
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oddsportal.com. 372 observations were deleted because bookmaker odds could not be
matched.11 Therefore, the final sample consists of 4,119 matches.
The website oddsportal.com publishes both opening and closing decimal odds of-
fered by Tipico and up to 62 other bookmakers. The opening odds are the first odds
published by a bookmaker, usually one to two weeks in advance, whereas the closing
odds are the last odds offered before the match starts. For the empirical analysis we
use the closing decimal odds. However, the main results would not change in any
significant way if we used the opening odds. For about 60% of all bets, the closing
odds are the same as the opening odds.
Decimal odds denote the payoff of a successful bet. For example, if the odds for
an over bet are 2.50, a one dollar wager pays $2.50 if the total score is 3 or more. We
converted the decimal odds into prices, which are the reciprocal of the decimal odds
(e.g., p = 1/2.50 = 0.40). These prices indicate how much a bettor has to invest in
order to collect $1 in the event of a successful bet (Forrest & Simmons, 2008). Figure
1a shows the distribution of the prices from over bets offered by the bookmaker
Tipico. The mean price is 0.54 and the prices appear to be fairly symmetrically
distributed around the mean. Figure 1b presents the corresponding distribution of
the betting volume percentages wagered on the over bet. This distribution is highly
asymmetric, with a mean of 0.82 and a skewness of -1.11. Thus, on average, about
80% of the betting volume is concentrated on the over bet, leaving 20% of the betting
volume for the under bet. To test whether the bookmaker prices displayed in Figure
1a exhibit a systematic bias due to the highly asymmetric volume distribution, we
conduct simple t-tests for differences in mean objective winning probabilities, betting
11The betting volume does not significantly differ between matches with and without missing odds
information.
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Figure 1: Distribution of bookmaker prices and betting volume percentages from over bets
volume percentages, prices, and bettor returns on a one unit wager between over and
under bets.
To more specifically relate the bettor returns to sentimental betting volume, we
estimate a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) model. We use the over bet as an identifying
instrumental indicator variable to predict the betting volume in the first stage. The
first stage regression is specified as
volumeij = θ0 + θ1 · overij + vij (1)
where volumeij labels the betting volume percentage and overij refers to an indicator
variable equaling 1 for the over bet and 0 otherwise for each match i and betting
contract type j ∈ {over, under}. For each match i, we randomly select either the
over or the under bet to ensure independence across observations. The overij is a
valid instrument because it is highly correlated with the betting volume due to a
general human preference for a high score. Additionally, the bettor sentiment on the
over bets is unrelated to potential confounders such as the winning probability of the
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favorite team in a match. Hence, our instrument is unlikely to be correlated with the
error term of the second stage regression. The second stage is specified as
returnij = β0 + β1 · ̂volumeij + ij (2)
where returnij denotes the bettor’s return on a one unit wager calculated from the
closing price offered by the bookmaker and ̂volumeij refers to the predicted betting
volume according to the first stage regression.
3 Results
Table 1 shows the results from two-sided t-tests for the differences in mean objective
winning probabilities (winning), betting volume percentages (volume), prices (price)
and bettor returns (return) between over and under bets. The average objective
Table 1: t-tests for differences in mean winning probabilities, volume, prices and returns
winning volume price return
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Std. Dev.
over 0.498 0.008 0.817 0.003 0.544 0.001 -0.086 0.015 0.942
under 0.502 0.008 0.183 0.003 0.539 0.001 -0.068 0.015 0.959
∆ -0.005 0.156 0.633*** 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.018 0.029
Notes: The table presents the results from a simple two-sided t-test for the difference in mean
objective winning probabilities (winning), betting volume percentages (volume), prices (price) and
returns (return) between over and under bets. Additionally, the last column on the right hand side
displays the standard deviations of the returns. The number of observations for each test is 4,119.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
probability for the over bet to win is 49.8% which is not significantly different from
the average probability of 50.2% for the under bet to win. By contrast, the betting
volume is highly concentrated on the over bet, accounting for 81.7% of the betting
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volume on average. However, this highly asymmetric betting volume does not seem to
affect bookmaker pricing and bettor returns. The t-tests show that the differences in
the mean prices and mean returns are not statistically different between the over bet
and the under bet.12 Non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-rank tests confirm these findings.
Risk considerations of bettors or bookmakers should not affect these results because
the objective probability of the over and the under bet to win is close to 50% (see
first column of Table 1) and the standard deviations of the returns are very similar
(see last column of Table 1).13
The results from the 2SLS model are shown in Table 2. Column (1) reports the esti-
mates of the first stage regression, which predicts the betting volume. Our instrument
over is a strong predictor for the volume with a partial R2 of around 88%. Column
Table 2: 2SLS regressions of returns
First stage: volume Second stage: return
(1) (2)
̂volume -0.038
(0.047)
over 0.633***
(0.005)
Partial R2 / R2 87.81% 0.67%
N 4,119 4,119
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 3,166***
Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates for closing prices and bettor returns. The betting volume
is instrumented by the over indicator variable. For each match, only one bet (either over or under)
is randomly included. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In
all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively.
(2) reports the estimates of the second stage regression on the relation between the
12This result is robust to the use of returns calculated from opening prices of Tipico and returns
calculated from prices offered by up to 62 different bookmakers including Bwin, Ladbrokes and
William Hill.
13The results of a variance ratio test show that the standard deviations of the returns from over and
under bets are not statistically different.
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predicted betting volume and bettor returns. The sentimental betting volume does
not significantly affect the returns. Thus, high sentimental betting volume does not
cause abnormally high or low bettor returns.14
4 Conclusion
We use actual betting volume data to analyze the effect of bettor sentiment on book-
maker pricing in the over/under 2.5 goals betting market of soccer matches. This
market offers ideal conditions because bettors exhibit a natural preference for high
match scores. At the same time, the empirical winning probability for either bet
to win is close to 50%, indicating that potential risk considerations of bettors and
bookmakers that could interfere our results are negligible in this setting.
We find that the betting volume from the over/under market is highly concen-
trated on the over bet, accounting for over 80% of the betting volume on average.
However, this imbalance is not associated with systematic sentimental biases in book-
maker pricing and bettor returns.
Our results do not necessarily imply that bookmaker prices are always unbiased.
If the sentimental betting volume is positively correlated with the objective winning
probability of the underlying bet, bookmakers’ prices may still be biased. Forrest
and Simmons (2008) and Franck et al. (2011) find that bookmakers offer significantly
more favorable prices for bets on wins by strong teams with a large supporter base.
This paper shows that in a setting where risk considerations of both bettors and
bookmakers are negligible, bookmakers do not distort their prices to exploit the bettor
preference to bet on a high number of goals in a soccer match. Instead, bookmakers
14Again, this finding is robust to the use of returns based on opening prices and returns based on
average bookmaker prices calculated from prices offered by up to 62 different bookmakers.
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offer prices that reflect their best prediction of the true outcome probability and
add an equally distributed commission, even when bettor sentiment leads to a highly
asymmetric volume distribution.
One possible explanation for this finding is that bettors can easily compare the
prices listed by several different bookmakers and find the best prices through a number
of websites such as oddsportal.com or betbrain.com, which increases the bettors’ price
sensitivity. Thus, small price changes tend to have a large impact on the betting
volume and eventually on the bookmaker’s profit. If a bookmaker increases the price
(shortens the odds) of an over bet, sentimental bettors would switch to a competitor.
On the other hand, if a bookmaker lowers the price (lengthens the odds) of an over
bet, he gains additional sentimental betting volume, however, at a higher risk of
substantial losses.
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A.4
Liquidity, Market Efficiency and the Influence of
Noise Traders: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from
the Betting Industry*
Abstract
This paper examines how liquidity affects market efficiency in a market
environment where securities’ true values are revealed at a predetermined point
in time. We employ differences in minimum tick sizes at the betting exchange
Betfair which induce exogenous variation in liquidity. The results show that
liquidity significantly decreases market efficiency for bets on weekend matches
but not for bets on weekday matches. As uninformed noise bettors are more
likely to bet on weekends than on weekdays, the type of liquidity seems to
matter for market efficiency.
JEL Classification: G12, G14
Keywords: Liquidity, Market Efficiency, Noise Trading, Betting Market
*This paper has been written jointly with Stephan Nu¨esch and Egon Franck.
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1 Introduction
To provide an optimal allocation of capital, financial markets have to be information-
ally efficient, so that prices of securities fully reflect all information available (Fama,
1991). This paper tests how liquidity affects informational market efficiency. The
relation between liquidity and efficiency is controversial. On the one hand, liquid-
ity lowers transaction costs and the impact of individual orders on prices (O’Hara,
1995). Thus, arbitrageurs have more incentive to acquire information and trade more
aggressively on this information, which should force the prices to drift closer to their
fundamental values (Kyle, 1985). Several empirical studies show that increasing liq-
uidity results in enhanced market efficiency (e.g., Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyam,
2008; Chung & Hrazdil, 2010a; Sadka & Scherbina, 2007; Wurgler & Zhuravskaya,
2002). On the other hand, high liquidity due to irrational noise traders could prevent
arbitrageurs from trading sufficiently against them and result in a higher mispricing
relative to the prices in illiquid markets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; De Long, Shleifer,
Summers, & Waldmann, 1990). Bloomfield, OHara, and Saar (2009) and Linnainmaa
(2010) provide empirical evidence of greater mispricings in liquid markets.
Empirical financial studies face two major limitations when investigating the rela-
tion between liquidity and market efficiency. First, fundamental values of traditional
financial products are not observable. Therefore, all field studies must test market
efficiency jointly with an equilibrium model (Fama, 1970). Second, the amount of
liquidity is an endogenous function of the pricing accuracy. In models of adverse se-
lection, for example, a release of information about a security’s fundamental values,
i.e., an improvement in market efficiency, is associated with preceding periods of illiq-
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uidity because limit order submitters worry that other traders who submit market
orders possess superior information (Tetlock, 2008).
We use data from a major betting exchange to investigate the relation between
liquidity and market efficiency. As in order-driven financial markets, betting ex-
changes facilitate a continuous double auction process. However, betting exchanges
differ from financial markets in their informational environment. Betting contracts
have a clear endpoint at which their fundamental value is revealed. Furthermore, the
underlying outcome of such contracts, e.g., the home team to win a match, is affected
neither by the trader’s expectations nor by macroeconomic factors. By contrast, tradi-
tional financial securities are infinitely lived and have, unless the underlying firm goes
bankrupt, no point in time where the true fundamental value is revealed. Thus, bet-
ting markets offer a unique setting for measuring the informational market efficiency
of prices (Sauer, 1998; Verbeek, 2011).
So far, few studies link the market efficiency of betting markets to liquidity. Tetlock
(2008) employs data of financial and sporting contracts from the TradeSports ex-
change. He concludes that higher liquidity increases mispricing and that prices of
illiquid securities converge more quickly towards their fundamental value. To over-
come the reverse causality problem between liquidity and efficiency, Tetlock (2008)
employs the exchange-wide trading activities as instrumental variables for changes in
liquidity. However, because aggregated liquidity might be related to aggregated mis-
pricing within the exchange, these instrumental variables may not be truly exogenous.
Croxson and Reade (2011) use high-frequency in-play betting data on soccer matches
from a betting exchange and do not find any significant relationship between liquidity
and market efficiency. They do not address the endogeneity of liquidity.
To estimate the causal effect of liquidity on market efficiency we employ differences
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in minimum tick sizes that create exogenous variation in liquidity at the betting
exchange Betfair. In combination with the observation of the fundamental value of
the contracts traded at the betting exchange, this exogenous variation means that
Betfair offers a quasi-experiment to investigate the influence of liquidity on market
efficiency.
We use betting contracts on 2,227 soccer matches played in the English Premier
League from 2006-2011 and in the Spanish Primera Diviso´n from 2009-2011 traded
at the betting exchange Betfair. Using different liquidity and efficiency measures, the
results from our two-stage least squares model (2SLS) estimation show that market
efficiency is negatively associated with liquidity.
Earlier studies (Kopelman & Minkin, 1991; Sobel & Raines, 2003; Sung & Johnson,
2007) have shown that the betting activity at weekend matches is characterized by
a higher share of irrational noise bettors than betting activity at weekday matches.
We find that the negative effect of liquidity is more pronounced for weekend matches
whereas the effect becomes insignificant for weekday matches.
Overall, our findings indicate that liquidity with a high fraction of noise bettors
decreases market efficiency, whereas liquidity with a low fraction of noise bettors is
not significantly related to market efficiency. A high fraction of noise bettors prevents
prices from adjusting to their fundamental values. One reason for the persistence of
mispricing is bettor sentiment, which causes noise bettors to prefer bets with partic-
ular characteristics. Similar to investor sentiment in financial markets (e.g. Barberis,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Baker & Wurgler, 2006; De Long et al., 1990), bettor sen-
timent is found to bias prices in betting markets due to incorrect perceptions (e.g.,
Kuypers, 2000; Levitt, 2004) or loyalty towards certain teams (e.g., Forrest & Sim-
mons, 2008; Franck, Verbeek, & Nu¨esch, 2011).
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 describes our data and discusses how we process our empirical
analysis. Section 4 reports the main estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The relation between liquidity and market efficiency has important implications for
policy makers and regulators. From a theoretical perspective, two competing hy-
potheses have evolved. On one side, liquidity facilitates the elimination of mispricings
and thus increases market efficiency due to lower transaction costs (O’Hara, 1995).
On the other side, liquidity due to uninformed or irrational noise trading decreases
market efficiency because rational agents are unable to fully offset noise traders’ biases
(De Long et al., 1990). Earlier studies within the market microstructure literature
have also addressed the link between liquidity and market efficiency. However, the
findings are widely inconsistent.
Several studies support the view that prices of securities in liquid markets exhibit
higher market efficiency. The theoretical model proposed by Kyle (1985) shows that
with increasing liquidity informed traders are able to trade more heavily on their
information without impacting the prices. As such, liquidity providers camouflage the
trading from informed traders which allows them to increase their profits. Therefore,
liquid markets reduce the transaction costs for arbitrageurs and encourage them to
acquire information in those markets to correct mispricings.
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) provide indirect empirical evidence and test how
prices respond to exogenous demand shocks of stocks that were added to the S&P
500 Index. The authors find that stocks without close substitutes, which thus present
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a higher arbitrage risk, exhibit a steeper demand curve and higher mispricing. As
steeper demand curves imply less liquidity, mispricing is greater in illiquid markets
due to risk averse arbitrageurs who will trade less aggressively when arbitrage risk is
high.
Sadka and Scherbina (2007) provide further evidence for a positive link between
liquidity and market efficiency. They investigate stocks with high analyst disagree-
ment. As the information about the earnings becomes publicly available at a certain
point in time, mispricing of such stocks tends to be short-lived. Sadka and Scherbina
(2007) find that less liquid stocks tend to be more severely overpriced due to higher
trading costs. In an additional time series analysis, the authors show that increasing
aggregated liquidity accelerates the convergence of prices to fundamentals.
The study of Chordia et al. (2008) is one of the first to analyze the short horizon
return predictability in connection with liquidity. The authors examine the five-
minute return predictability from lagged order flow of 193 NYSE firms as an inverse
measure of market efficiency. Between 1993 and 2003, the minimum tick size in bid-
ask spreads decreased, providing an exogenous increase in liquidity. Because return
predictability declined across the three tick size regimes, liquidity is found to be
positively related to market efficiency. Chordia et al. (2008) conclude that higher
liquidity facilitates efficiency via two distinct channels. First, arbitrageurs better
absorb the asymmetric order flow in periods of high liquidity, which speeds up the
convergence of prices to fundamental values. Second, the reduced minimum price
change enables the correction of smaller mispricings.
Chung and Hrazdil (2010a) apply the methodology of Chordia et al. (2008) to a
comprehensive sample of 4,222 NYSE firms between 1993 and 2004. Using the inverse
adjusted R2 from the estimation results of the short horizon return prediction as a
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proxy for market efficiency, the authors find that liquidity measured as the inverse
effective bid-ask spread is positively related to market efficiency. This positive relation
is amplified during periods of newly disclosed information. The findings of Chung
and Hrazdil (2010a) are robust to potential confounding effects emerging from the
trading frequency and the firm size. A further study by Chung and Hrazdil (2010b)
investigates the return predictability of 11,073 NASDAQ firms across three minimum
tick size regimes. As before, they observe that liquidity increases market efficiency.
One major concern of using the return predictability as an inverse indicator of mar-
ket efficiency is that large deviations from fundamental values could be present with-
out leaving statistically identifiable traces in the pattern of ex-post returns (Summers,
1986). Additionally, Chordia et al. (2008) and Chung and Hrazdil (2010a, 2010b) an-
alyze the relation between liquidity and market efficiency during a time period in
which large technical advances were made and access to information became less
costly. Hence, contemporaneous confounders are very difficult to rule out.
Other studies support the view that prices of securities in liquid markets exhibit
lower market efficiency. De Long et al. (1990) argue that noise traders’ beliefs could
deviate from the asset’s fundamental value over long periods of time. These beliefs
affect prices and lead to a loss for the arbitrageur if she has to liquidate her position
before the price recovers. The fear of loss hinders the arbitrageur from entering a
position and trading aggressively against noise traders in the first place. As a result,
arbitrageurs start to predict the pseudosignals from noise traders such as volume and
price patterns or sentiment indices rather than trading on fundamentals to correct
mispricings.
Moreover, the model of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) challenges the view that a
large number of tiny arbitragers with small stakes are the ones taking position against
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mispricings. In fact, the small traders are typically not the ones who are informed.
Rather, arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of professionals who
take large positions with funds from outside investors. When prices diverge far from
fundamental values due to noise traders, arbitrageurs with their own funds would
generally increase their positions. However, arbitrageurs who manage other people’s
money have to fear an early liquidation of the positions due to their investors’ pressure.
Hence, arbitrageurs tend to avoid such volatile positions, which makes them less
effective in achieving market efficiency.
One explanation of the persistence of mispricing over longer periods of time is
investor sentiment that results from psychological misperceptions in making forecasts.
For example, Barberis et al. (1998) predict in their theoretical model that investors
underreact to earnings announcements and similar events, and overreact to consistent
patterns of good or bad news.
In an experimental market study, Bloomfield et al. (2009) examine how uninformed
noise trading affects market efficiency. As expected, such traders increase the market
liquidity dramatically. However, the presence of uniformed noise traders also harms
market efficiency because their unwise contrarian strategies prevent market prices
from adjusting to new information.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Linnainmaa (2010) who investigates limit
orders using a detailed dataset of investor trading records. In his data set from
Finland, 76.3% of individuals’ orders are limit orders. One reason for individual
traders to use limit orders is the potential gain from the liquidity demand of impatient
investors who place market orders. However, their limit orders only execute if the
price moves against the order, for example around positive earnings announcements.
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As a result, such individual and uninformed traders can be interpreted as liquidity
providers who harm the process of adjustment to the intrinsic value.
Studies that investigate the link of liquidity and market efficiency in prediction
and/or betting markets are scarce. Tetlock (2008) investigates contracts on binary
financial and sporting event outcomes from the TradeSports exchange, where the
fundamental values of the contracts are revealed at a predetermined point in time. To
overcome the reverse causality problem between liquidity and efficiency, Tetlock (2008)
constructs instrumental variables based on the exchange-wide liquidity. However,
if aggregated liquidity is related to aggregated mispricing, those instruments may
not fully resolve the endogeneity problem. One likely scenario would be that the
aggregated liquidity at the weekend is widely influenced by casual bettors who might
also affect the market efficiency. The results of Tetlock (2008) indicate that liquidity
increases the deviation of prices from the fundamental value of the contracts and
thus harms market efficiency. Similar to Linnainmaa (2010), he explains this finding
by naive and passive limit order traders who bet against market order traders in
informative periods and thus decelerate the response of prices to information.
Hartzmark and Solomon (2012) provide further evidence for the negative effect
of liquidity on market efficiency in betting markets. They examine NFL betting
contracts from the TradeSports exchange and find that the more liquid Monday Night
games exhibit greater mispricings than other games.
Croxson and Reade (2011) use high-frequency soccer betting market data from
the betting exchange Betfair. Although the main focus lies on a general assessment of
the market efficiency at the betting exchange, Croxson and Reade (2011) investigate
whether liquidity affects mispricings. Using the squared difference between the effi-
cient price drift estimated by a Poisson model and the actual price drift as efficiency
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measure, the authors are unable to find any effect of liquidity on mispricings and
conclude that the price drift is efficient. However, the study of Croxson and Reade
(2011) does not address the potential simultaneity of liquidity and market efficiency.
Overall, previous findings are inconsistent with regard to the general effect of
liquidity on market efficiency. However, there is wide consensus that noise trader
liquidity decreases market efficiency.
Kopelman and Minkin (1991) state that weekend bettors at the racetrack are
more casual and choose their bets based on irrelevant factors such as the name or
color of the horses, whereas weekday bettors are highly knowledgeable about their
pursuits and motivated by the desire for financial gain. Moreover, Sobel and Raines
(2003) find that weekend bettors wager a significantly lower amount per person and
are less informed. Finally, Sung and Johnson (2007) provide evidence that prices
for weekend markets exhibit lower market efficiency than weekday markets because
weekend markets are populated by a larger proportion of noise bettors.
This paper is the first to investigate the relation between liquidity and market
efficiency in a setting where exogenous variation in liquidity is created by different
minimum tick sizes and the fundamental values of securities are revealed at a prede-
termined point in time. By investigating the effect of liquidity on market efficiency
for weekend and weekday matches separately, we are able to test the hypothesis that
noise trader liquidity decreases market efficiency.
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3 Data and Methods
3.1 Sample
We use betting data on professional soccer matches from the popular winner betting
contracts on home win, draw or away win traded at Betfair, the most prominent
betting exchange worldwide. Betfair provides an electronic platform on which bettors
can directly trade bets with each other in a continuous double auction. Thus, as in
the order-driven system of financial markets, individual bettors can post limit and/or
market orders under which they are willing to place a bet on (buy order) or against
(sell order) a given outcome of a match. The latent demand and supply in the form of
limit orders is collected and displayed in the order book with a bid-ask spread between
the best buying and selling orders. A transaction takes place whenever two parties
agree on one price (Verbeek, 2011). This new form of sports betting has grown
rapidly in the last years. Its economic relevance is now considerable and in some
cases comparable to common financial markets. Betfair had over 4 million registered
customers and processed more than 7 million transactions on an average day in 2012
(Betfair, 2012b). The NYSE Group processed about 5.5 million trades on an average
trading day in 2012 (NYSE, 2012).
Our sample consists of decimal betting odds information on 2,227 matches played
in the English Premier League from 2006/07-2011/12 and in the Spanish Primera
Diviso´n from 2010/11-2011/12. The dataset covers the last three hours before match
start and is provided by Fracsoft , a vendor of historical Betfair data.15 Decimal
15The completeness of the data increased continuously over time. The percentages of missing matches
are 64% (Season 06/07), 52% (07/08), 20% (08/09), 13% (09/10), 13% (10/11) 12% (11/12) for the
English Premier League and 21% (10/11), 19% (11/12) for the Spanish Primera Diviso´n. Because
matches are missing due to technical reasons (Choi & Hui, 2012), sample selection should not affect
our results.
84
betting odds denote the payoff of a successful bet. For example, if the odds for an
home win bet are 1.60, a one dollar wager pays $1.60 if the home team wins the
match.
For each event within a match, i.e., home win, draw and away win, we have second-
by-second information on the best back odds, which are the best odds offered to buy
a bet, the best lay odds, which are the best odds to sell a bet, and the last odds to
have been matched. For the ease of interpretation we convert the decimal odds into
prices, defined as the reciprocal of the decimal odds (e.g., p = 1
1.60
= 0.625), ranging
from zero to one. These prices indicate how much a bettor has to invest in order to
collect $1 in the event of a successful bet (Forrest & Simmons, 2008). Additionally,
our dataset contains the current limit order volume available on both back and lay
bets and the cumulative trading volume until time t before match start.
3.2 Liquidity Measures
The most commonly used measures of liquidity in the financial market microstruc-
ture literature are spread-related (e.g., Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Chordia, Roll, &
Subrahmanyam, 2001; Hasbrouck & Seppi, 2001; Lin, Snager, & Booth, 1995). The
spread approximates the costs incurring with trading. Thus, small spreads indicate
high liquidity in the market (Von Wyss, 2004). We follow the approach of Chordia et
al. (2008) and use the quoted spread, defined as the difference between the lowest ask
price and the highest bid price, as an inverse measure of liquidity. For each match i,
event e ∈ {home win, draw, away win} and time t before match start, we calculated
the quoted spread (QSPR) as
QSPRiet = p
back
iet − playiet (1)
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where pback refers to the best ask price and play to the best bid price, respectively.
The quoted spread is always positive and its lower limit is at the minimum tick size
(Von Wyss, 2004).
A unique feature of the Betfair trading platform is the increment rule that defines
the minimum tick size. Table 1 depicts the odds increments over the possible odds
range at Betfair. For short odds, e.g., between 1.01 and 1.99, the minimum odds
Table 1: Odds increments at Betfair
odds ]1;2[ [2;3[ [3;4[ [4;6[ [6;10[ [10;20[ [20;30[ [30;50[ [50;100[ [100;1000[
odds inc. 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
Notes: The table presents the acceptable odds increments at the Betfair betting exchange as stated
in Betfair (2012a).
increment is 0.01, whereas for long odds, e.g., between 10 and 19, the minimum odds
increment increases to 0.5. The increment rule results in a discontinuous and non-
linear minimum quoted spread (MSPR) function. Figure 1 depicts the minimum
quoted spread function defined by Betfair and the actual quoted spread from our
dataset for all possible midquote prices (pM) calculated as the average between the
best ask price and the best bid price. As expected, the correlation between the quoted
spread and the minimum quoted spread seems to be positive, but the minimum quoted
spread does not predict the actual quoted spread perfectly. Moreover, there are clear
drops in the quoted spreads at midquote price levels of 0.50 and 0.33, for example.
As a second measure of liquidity we use the quote slope which combines both price
and quantity information (Hasbrouck & Seppi, 2001). If more volume is available at
the best bid or ask price, the quote slope decreases and the market is more liquid.
Similarly, if the bid and ask price are closer to each other, the quote slope decreases
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Figure 1: Minimum spread function and quoted spread
and the market is more liquid. Thus, a high quote slope indicates low liquidity.
Formally, the quote slope in the betting exchange market is defined as
QSLPiet =
pbackiet − playiet
ln(volbackiet ) + ln(vol
lay
iet )
(2)
where volback and vollay denote the best back and lay volume available in the limit
order book for event e at time t.
Several financial studies such as Chordia et al. (2001), Gervais, Kaniel, and Min-
gelgrin (2001) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) incorporate volume-related liquidity
measures. Therefore, we use the logarithmized cumulative trading volume from the
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opening of the market till time t before match start (LnV OL) as a third liquidity
measure.
Table 2 reports summary statistics associated with our liquidity measures 60 min-
utes before match start. Because each of the 2,227 matches consists of the three events
home win, draw and away win the total number of observations is 6,681. As expected,
the average quoted spread is higher than the average minimum quoted spread. The
average cumulative volume traded is £248,000.
Table 2: Summary statistics of liquidity measures (60 minutes before match start)
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
MSPR Minimum quoted spread 6,681 0.0040 0.0010 0.0008 0.0090
QSPR Quoted spread 6,681 0.0042 0.0014 0.0008 0.0149
QSLP Quote slope 6,681 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0012
LnV OL Log. cum. volume traded 6,681 11.261 1.5003 7.3708 15.541
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of liquidity measures 60 minutes before match start.
The data is obtained from Fracsoft and spans the seasons 2006/07-2011/12, including matches from
the English Premier League and the Spanish Primera Diviso´n. The total number of matches is 2,227,
with each match covering the three events home win, draw and away win.
3.3 Market Efficiency Measures
Our measures of market efficiency make use of the advantage that the fundamental
value of each betting contract is observed after the match. Because the outcome of
a bet is either 1 (win) or 0 (loss) the prices quoted at the betting exchange can be
interpreted as the market’s forecasting probability of an individual bet to win. Hence,
we employ scoring rules that have been developed by the probabilistic forecasts veri-
fication literature to provide a summary measure for the efficiency of prices (Gneiting
& Raftery, 2007). Scoring rules assess the ex post informativeness of the probabilities
after the outcome is known (Jose, Nau, & Winkler, 2009).
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The most common scoring rule is the Brier score (Brier, 1950). The Brier score is
based on the squared error, defined as the squared difference between individual pairs
of forecasts and observations. Because the Brier score captures both the resolution
and the calibration of a forecast, it forms an attractive measure of market efficiency
(Murphy & Winkler, 1987; Gneiting, Balabdaoui, & Raftery, 2007). The resolution
refers to the ability of the forecast probability to discriminate between high- and
low-probability events, whereas the calibration refers to the correspondence of the
forecast probability and the true observed frequencies (I. Mason, 1982). To also
take the difficulty of the forecasting problem into account, the Brier score is widely
expressed as a skill score that measures the extent to which a forecast outperforms
a reference forecast (S. Mason, 2004; Wilks, 1995). Formally, the Brier skill score
(BSS) is defined as
BSSiet = 1− (Yie − p
M
iet)
2
(Yie − prefiet )2
(3)
where Y refers to the actual outcome, which is either a win (1) or a loss (0), and
pM refers to the quoted midpoint price as the market’s valuation for the underlying
value of the bet. The numerator of the ratio reflects the Brier score of the actual
forecast and the denominator reflects the Brier score of a reference forecast. One of
the most widely used reference forecasts is the climatological probability of the outcome
to occur (Jolliffe & Stephenson, 2003). In our setting, the climatological probability is
the noninformative price of 0.333 for each of the three events within a match. Thus,
the denominator takes on the value 0.444 if the outcome occurs and 0.111 if the
outcome does not occur. The BSS ranges from one for a perfect forecast, through
zero for a forecast that provides no improvement over the reference, to negative values
for forecasts worse than the reference (S. Mason, 2004).
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Our second measure of market efficiency is the absolute error skill score (AESS)
which is more reliable than the Brier skill score in the presence of outliers (Armstrong,
2001). The AESS is based on the ratio of the absolute error of the actual forecast
and the absolute error of a reference forecast. We calculate the absolute error skill
score as
AESSiet = 1− | Yie − p
M
iet |
| Yie − prefite |
(4)
The AESS has a value of one for a perfect accuracy, a value of zero when the forecast
contains no skill and a negative value when the accuracy is lower than the uninformed
reference forecast of 0.333. Table 3 reports the summary statistics of our market
Table 3: Summary statistics of efficiency measures (60 minutes before match start)
Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BSS Brier skill score 6,681 0.1166 0.8724 -6.5064 0.9985
AESS Absolute error skill score 6,681 0.1511 0.4035 -1.7398 0.9613
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of efficiency measures 60 minutes before a match
start. The data is obtained from Fracsoft and spans the seasons 2006/07-2011/12, including matches
from the English Premier League and the Spanish Primera Diviso´n. The total number of matches
is 2,227, with each match covering the three events home win, draw and away win.
efficiency measures 60 minutes before match start. The positive means show that
betting exchange prices incorporate more information on average than the reference
forecast.
3.4 Identification Strategy
Our empirical analysis is divided into three parts. First, we make use of the dis-
continuity of the minimum quoted spread function displayed in Figure 1 by forming
subsamples of observations which are±0.025 price units around the discontinuity area.
This results in two groups with different inherent liquidity but similar prices. One
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group with observations below the discontinuity is considered as the high gap MSPR
group. The other group with observations above the discontinuity is considered as
the low gap MSPR group. We conduct parametric t-tests as well as nonparamet-
ric Wilcoxon rank sum tests of the difference in market efficiency between the two
liquidity groups.
In a second analysis, we use the predetermined minimum quoted spread function
(MSPR) of Betfair as an identifying instrumental variable for our liquidity measures
(L). The first stage equation is
Lie = θ0 + θ1 ·MSPRie + θ2 · pMie + θ · Γie + uie (5)
where pM refers to the midquote price of the bet and Γ refers to a set of control
variables such as dummy variables for the event e, seasons and leagues. As can be
seen from Figure 1, the MSPR is an increasing function of pM , making the midquote
price an important control variable (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The second stage
equation is formulated as
Eie = β0 + β1 · L̂ie + β2 · pMie + β · Γie + ie (6)
where E is the measure of market efficiency and L̂ is the fitted value of the first stage
regression estimated in Equation (5). The second stage regression has the same set
of control variables as the first stage regression. Because we control for the midquote
price pM , the favorite-longshot bias does not distort our results. The favorite-longshot
bias refers to the empirical observation that favorite teams are often underpriced and
longshots are overpriced (e.g., Snowberg & Wolfers, 2010; Thaler & Ziemba, 1988).
Third, we split our sample into matches played on weekends and on weekdays and
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estimate Equations (5) and (6) for weekend and weekday matches separately. Based
on the findings from the previous literature (Kopelman & Minkin, 1991; Sobel &
Raines, 2003; Sung & Johnson, 2007) we expect liquidity on weekends to be more
heavily affected by noise traders than liquidity on weekdays. Because all teams in
the same league play the same number of weekday matches, this allocation is neither
correlated with certain teams nor with their objective winning probability (Franck et
al., 2011).
4 Results
Table 4 presents the means of market efficiency of the low gap MSPR and the high
gap MSPR groups as well as the results of t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests on the
differences between the groups. While Panel A uses BSS as market efficiency measure,
Panel B uses AESS as efficiency measure. Table 4 shows that market efficiency is
significantly higher in the high gap MSPR group than in the low gap MSPR group,
independent of the efficiency measures and tests employed.16
Table 5 displays the results of the first stage regressions that relate the minimum
spread (MSPR) to the liquidity measures (QSPR, QSLP , and LnV OL). As ex-
pected, we find significantly positive effects of MSPR on our spread-related liquidity
measures and a significantly negative effect of MSPR on the logarithm of betting
volume. As the F -statistics of our identifying instrument are far beyond the critical
threshold value of 8.96 (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002), we do not have a weak in-
16This finding is robust to the use of the nonparametric relative operating characteristic curve (ROC)
as an alternative measure of market efficiency (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A.1). Moreover, betting
prices have significantly lower explanatory power in the low gap MSPR group than in the high gap
MSPR group, which also confirms that liquidity decreases market efficiency (see Table A.1 in
Appendix A.1)
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Table 4: Liquidity and market efficiency at discontinuity area
Panel A: comparison of BSS
t-test Wilcoxon rank sum test
N Mean SE t rank sum expected z
Low gap MSPR 1,353 0.3442 0.0151 1,584,839 1,730,487
High gap MSPR 1,204 0.3887 0.0176 1,685,564 1,539,916
∆ 2,557 -0.0445 0.0230 -1.932* -7.817***
Panel B: comparison of AESS
t-test Wilcoxon rank sum test
N Mean SE t rank sum expected z
Low gap MSPR 1,353 0.2652 0.0093 1,584,839 1,730,487
High gap MSPR 1,204 0.3149 0.0108 1,685,564 1,539,916
∆ 2,557 -0.0498 0.0145 -3.507*** -7.817***
Notes: The table presents the results of simple two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests based
on the two groups low gap MSPR and high gap MSPR. The groups are formed from observations
located ±0.025 price units around the discontinuity gaps of the MSPR function. Panel A displays
the results for the differences in BSS and Panel B displays the results for the differences in AESS.
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
strument problem. Table 5 also shows that the midquote price pM positively affects
liquidity, which indicates that bettors prefer betting on favorite teams over betting on
longshot teams (see also Levitt, 2004). Additionally, matches played in the English
Premier League are associated with more liquidity than matches played in the Spanish
Primera Diviso´n. This is not surprising as sports betting is more popular in England
than in Spain.
Table 6 reports the results of the second stage regression. We find positive co-
efficients of the quoted spread and the quote slope, and negative coefficients of the
trading volume on BSS (Columns (1) - (3)) and on AESS, respectively (Columns (4)
- (6)). Thus, liquidity is negatively related to market efficiency.17 In all specifications
17The results remain virtually the same if we use the effective spread as an alternative spread-related
measure. The effective spread is defined as twice the absolute difference of the last transaction
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Table 5: First stage results of 2SLS model estimation
QSPR QSLP LnV OL
(1) (2) (3)
MSPR 1.019*** 0.063*** -93.12***
(0.022) (0.002) (16.41)
pM -0.0003*** -0.0002*** 5.623***
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.112)
home -0.00003 0.00000 0.692***
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.049)
away 0.00006 0.00002*** 0.613***
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.041)
Primera Divisio´n 0.0001* 0.00004*** -1.097***
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.045)
Season Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 2,227 2,227 2,227
partial R2 52.68% 30.69% 1.33%
F -test of the excluded instrument 2,172*** 806*** 32.21***
Notes: The table presents the first stage estimates for the quoted spread (QSPR), quote slope
(QSLP ) and the cumulative trading volume (LnV OL) from the Betfair minimum quoted spread
(MSPR). The data is taken 60 minutes before the match starts. To ensure independence
across observations, we randomly selected one event (home win, draw, away win) per match.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
we include the midquote price pM , event dummies, a league dummy for the Primera
Divisio´n and seasonal dummies as control variables.18
We run the regressions separately for each minute during the last three hours
before match start. The resulting coefficient estimates for the quoted spread on the
Brier skill score and on the absolute error skill score are displayed in Figure A.2 of
Appendix A.2. The estimated coefficients are positive and remain relatively stable
price and the prevailing midquote price between the best bid and ask price (Bessembinder, 2003).
Moreover, our results do not change if we use the absolute pricing error to measure market inef-
ficiency employed by other studies such as Bloomfield et al. (2009), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)
or Snowberg and Wolfers (2010).
18The results are also robust to the inclusion of team dummies. Thus, time-constant team popularity
does not seem to affect the relation between liquidity and market efficiency.
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Table 6: Second stage results of 2SLS model estimation for BSS and AESS
BSS AESS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q̂SPR 52.45** 30.99***
(20.54) (9.730)
Q̂SLP 846.23** 500.01***
(334.01) (159.97)
̂LnV OL -0.574** -0.339***
(0.242) (0.119)
pM -2.217*** -2.063*** 0.994 -0.958*** -0.867*** 0.939
(0.186) (0.213) (1.410) (0.079) (0.091) (0.680)
home 0.054 0.049 0.449** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.323***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.182) (0.019) (0.019) (0.091)
away 0.029 0.013 0.384** 0.090*** 0.081*** 0.230***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.159) (0.015) (0.015) (0.080)
Primera Divisio´n 0.051 0.015 -0.573** 0.031 0.010 -0.338**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.269) (0.021 (0.023) (0.132)
Season Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227 2,227
F (10; 2,216) 23.85*** 23.70*** 19.03*** 25.77*** 25.16*** 17.56***
Notes: The table reports the second stage estimates for the Brier skill score (BSS) and the abso-
lute error skills score (AESS). The data is taken 60 minutes before the match starts. To ensure
independence across observations, we randomly selected one event (home win, draw, away win) per
match. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
which suggests that the negative relation between liquidity and market efficiency is
robust over time.
In the following, we test whether the negative effect of liquidity on market effi-
ciency is more pronounced on weekends when the relative fraction of uninformed noise
traders is larger than on weekdays. Table 7 shows that the liquidity coefficients in
the second stage regressions are considerably larger on weekends than on weekdays.
Whereas liquidity significantly decreases market efficiency on weekends, the relation
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Table 7: Second stage results of 2SLS model estimation for BSS for weekend and weekday matches
BSS
Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q̂SPR 61.28*** 18.11
(23.032) (46.68)
Q̂SLP 966.20*** 328.84
(366.69) (848.24)
̂LnV OL -0.656** -0.377
(0.267) (1.035)
pM -2.266*** -1.962*** -2.080*** -1.914*** 1.396 0.282
(0.211) (0.392) (0.241) (0.453) ( 1.543) (6.303)
home 0.051 0.069 0.045 0.067 0.506** 0.336
(0.043) (0.079) (0.043) (0.078) (0.203) (0.759)
away 0.024 0.032 0.006 0.029 0.422** 0.320
(0.030) (0.070) (0.031) (0.065) (0.169) (0.832)
Primera Divisio´n 0.054 0.036 0.014 0.023 -0.634** -0.405
(0.053) (0.101) (0.056) (0.101) (0.288) (1.207)
Season Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,786 441 1,786 441 1,786 441
F (10; 1,775/430) 20.45*** 4.28*** 20.32*** 4.27*** 16.50*** 3.61***
F -test excl. instr. 1,637*** 683*** 649*** 192*** 30.37*** 1.71
Notes: The table reports the second stage estimates for the Brier skill score (BSS) for weekend
and weekday matches separately. The data is taken 60 minutes before the match starts. To ensure
independence across observations, we randomly selected one event (home win, draw, away win)
per match. The F -test of excluded instruments refers to the first stage. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
is not statistically significant on weekdays. Table 7 uses BSS as efficiency measure.
However, the results are qualitatively the same if we use AESS as efficiency measure
(see Table A.2 in Appendix A.3).
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyses how liquidity affects market efficiency using data from simple
betting contracts with observable fundamental values traded at the betting exchange
Betfair. To isolate the causal effect of liquidity on market efficiency we use the ex-
ogenously defined minimum spread function as an instrumental variable for liquidity.
Nonparametric tests and the 2SLS results show that higher liquidity is associated
with lower market efficiency. Because weekend matches are expected to exhibit more
irrational noise bettors than weekday matches, we conduct a subsample analysis for
weekend and weekday matches. We find that liquidity significantly decreases market
efficiency for weekend matches but not for weekday matches. On weekend matches,
informed bettors seem to be unable to bet aggressively enough against uninformed
and sentimental noise bettors to correct mispricings.
Our findings suggest that noise trader liquidity can destabilize prices and harm
market efficiency. Whereas the mispricing period in betting markets is limited by the
end of the match, mispricing periods due to noise trader liquidity can last much longer
in financial markets.
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A Appendix
A.1 ROC and Probit Estimation
A nonparametric ROC displays the relation between hit and false alarm rates which
indicates the degree of correct discrimination (I. Mason, 1982). The area under the
ROC curve ranges between 0.5 and 1.0 where 0.5 reflects no discrimination skill and 1.0
perfect discrimination skill. The ROC curves for both liquidity groups are displayed
in Figure A.1. The ROC curve of the high gap MSPR group lies mostly above the
ROC curve of the low gap MSPR group. Therefore, the area under the ROC curve
is higher for the high gap MSPR group (0.683) than the area for the low gap MSPR
Area under the ROC curve: 0.683
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Figure A.1: Nonparametric ROC estimation
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group (0.626), indicating a superior discrimination ability of the forecasts from the
high gap MSPR group.
This finding is consistent with the results from the probit regression that relates
the actual outcome Y (0/1) to the midquote prices for each liquidity group displayed
in Table A.1. The R2 from the high gap MSPR group is 9.43% and thus higher than
the R2 from the low gap MSPR group of 6.10%. Therefore, the midquote prices from
the high gap MSPR group predict the actual outcome better than the midquote prices
from the low gap MSPR group.
Table A.1: Results of probit estimation
Dependent variable: outcome Y (0/1)
Low gap MSPR High gap MSPR
(1) (2)
pM 0.841*** 0.926***
(0.100) (0.096)
home 0.053 -0.027
(0.035) (0.035)
away -0.024 -0.011
(0.027) (0.027)
R2 6.10% 9.43%
N 1,353 1,204
Notes: The table presents the marginal effects of a probit regression for the actual outcome of a bet
(0/1) for the two groups low gap MSPR and high gap MSPR, separately. The groups are formed
from observations located ±0.025 price units around the discontinuity gaps of the MSPR function.
The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at match level. in all models, *,
**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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A.2 Estimated Liquidity Effect over Time
Figure A.2 displays the coefficient estimates for the quoted spread on the Brier skill
score and on the absolute error skill score over the last three hours before match start.
The coefficient of QSPR on BSS is always positive and seems to be stable around 50.
However, there are cases in which the coefficient loses its significance. Nevertheless,
over 88% of the p-values for the coefficients are smaller than 5%. For the coefficients
of QSPR on AESS, more than 92% of the p-values exhibit a value smaller than
5%. The results are qualitatively the same if we use QSPL or LnV OL as liquidity
measures.
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Figure A.2: Estimated coefficients over time
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A.3 Estimates for AESS for Weekend and Weekday Matches
Table A.2: Second stage results of 2SLS estimation for AESS for weekend and weekday matches
AESS
Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Q̂SPR 35.66*** 10.96
(10.90) (21.51)
Q̂SLP 562.18*** 198.85
(175.78) (392.30)
̂LnV OL -0.382*** -0.228
(0.132) (0.480)
pM -0.959*** -0.921*** -0.850*** -0.893*** 1.172 0.435
(0.090) (0.169) (0.104) (0.189) (0.750) (2.882)
home 0.083*** 0.110*** 0.080*** 0.109*** 0.348*** 0.272
(0.022) (0.041) (0.022) (0.040) (0.102) (0.358)
away 0.086*** 0.097*** 0.075*** 0.095*** 0.317*** 0.271
(0.017) (0.034) (0.017) (0.033) (0.085) (0.383)
Primera Divisio´n 0.036 0.008 0.013 -0.0005 -0.364** -0.260
(0.024) (0.044) (0.026) (0.045) (0.143) (0.562)
Season Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,786 441 1,786 441 1,786 441
F (10; 1,775/430) 21.61*** 5.47*** 20.98*** 5.43*** 14.65*** 4.45***
F -test excl. instr. 1,637*** 683*** 649*** 192*** 30.37*** 1.71
Notes: The table reports the second stage estimates for the absolute error skill score (AESS) for
weekend and weekday matches separately. The data is taken 60 minutes before the match starts.
To ensure independence across observations, we randomly selected one event (home win, draw, away
win) per match. The F -test of excluded instruments refers to the first stage. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all models, *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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